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I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago, Congress enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 1 the
first comprehensive civil rights legislation 2 since the Reconstruction civil rights
statutes. I One of its provisions, Title VII, 4 prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment based on race, color, sex, national origin and religion. This statute has provid-
ed a strong vehicle' for minorities and women to challenge the myriad of
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (1964) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h(6) (1982)).
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975-1975f (1982), was the first civil rights act passed
since the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335. It established the United States Civil Rights Commission
to investigate and report to the President and Congress the status of civil rights in this country. The Commis-
sion had no civil rights law enforcement authority; however, it played an important role as a reliable report-
er of civil rights developments until President Reagan destroyed the bipartisan and objective tradition by
discharging three members of the Commission. See Berry v. Reagan, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,898,
dismissed as moot, 732 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (district court preliminarily enjoined President's dismis-
sal of two commissioners). In response to the public outcry and objections from Congress, a new structure
for the Commission was established whereby both Congress and the President would appoint members. 42
U.S.C. § 1975 (1982). The Civil Rights Act of 1960, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1982), had, among other things,
a limited federal elections voting record provision. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973-1973bb-1 (1982), is a comprehensive voting rights statute with enforcement powers conferred on the
Attorney General and aggrieved persons. The twenty-fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
eliminated poll tax on federal elections. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
3. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, was enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amend-
ment. It contained a list of federally protected rights and its most important provisions, derived from § I
and now codified at 42 U.S.C. § § 1981 and 1982 (1982) mandated that all persons born in the United States
are citizens and that all citizens shall have the same right as white persons to make and enforce contracts
and own or lease property. The Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968),
held that the portion of § I that survived as § 1982 prohibited private racial discrimination in the sale or
rental of real or personal property. Later, the Court extended Jones and applied § 1981 to other settings:
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973) (private swimming club excluded blacks);
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) ("remedy against discrimination in
private employment on the basis of race"); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (prohibited private
school from excluding children solely because they were black). The Court heard reargument in Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (per curiam), an employment race discrimination case,
to reconsider its decision in Runyon. After ratification of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, the Recon-
struction Congress again legislated to protect blacks. The Civil Rights Act of 1870, § 16, 16 Stat. 144, reenacted
key provisions of the 1866 Act to alleviate doubts about the constitutionality of that Act. See Eisenberg,
Federal Protection of Civil Rights, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (L. Levy ed. 1986).
It also provided protection for black voting rights. The federal effort to protect voting rights was expanded
by the Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 170. The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, provided for
equal enjoyment of accommodations. The Supreme Court invalidated the 1875 Act in the Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883). The rejection of a strong federal role in the enforcement of civil rights in that case "con-
ditioned the entire course of legal development in this [black rights] area for the next eighty years." Kinoy,
The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387, 388 (1967). See also Gressman,
The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MIcH. L. REV. 1323 (1952).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-718, 78
Stat. 253 (1964)); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972);
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978); Civil Rights Reorg. Plan No.
1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. 1155 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Greene, Twenty Years of Civil Rights: How Firm a Foundation?, 37 RUTGERs L. REV.
707, 721-30 (1985); Norton, Equal Employment Law: Crisis in Interpretation-Survival Against the Odds,
62 TUL. L. REV. 681 (1988).
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conscious 6  and unconscious 7 historically erected 8 impediments that severe-
6. For instance, in the early years of Title VII, it was not unusual for employers to segregate lunch
and recreational areas, lockers, restrooms, water fountains and other physical facilities. See, e.g., Firefight-
ers Inst. for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514 (8th Cir. 1977) (employer sponsored social
events organized along racial lines); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 458 (5th
Cir. 1971) (toilet, locker and shower facilities segregated based on race). Intentional discrimination con-
tinued into the 1980s. See, e.g., Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1434, modified, 742
F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1984) (segregated housing in measurably worse conditions for non-whites); Walker v.
Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1359 (11 th Cir. 1982) (when plaintiff objected to pervasive use of racial
slurs, employer responded by advising him that "racial slurs were 'just something a black man would have
to deal with in the South'"). Of course, racial harassment is not confined to the South, as implied by the
employer's statement in Walker. See, e.g., Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1420 (7th Cir.
1986) (black employee at Harvey, Illinois, plant subjected to racial graffiti on company bulletin boards and
bathroom walls, such as "'the KKK is not dead, nigger' "and other racial threats; supervisors "failed to take
more than half-hearted measures to stop the harassment" and also participated in making racist comments).
Examples of intentional discrimination continue to the present. See, e.g., Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d
1010, 1014-15 (8th Cir. 1988) (female traffic controllers at road construction site constructively discharged
as a result of hostile and abusive sexual harassment); Legrand v. Trustees of Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff,
821 F.2d 478, 483 (8th Cir. 1987) (employer's reasons for discharge and failure to rehire black electricians
pretext for intentional discrimination). However, after 25 years of Title VII litigation, employers intent on
discriminating have become sophisticated in masking the more overt manifestations of racial and sexual ani-
mus. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 778 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Today, employ-
ers, and their supervisors, who might choose to discriminate on the basis of race have become . . . too
sophisticated to use racial epithets or to leave glaring tracks if an employee is being discharged for race-
related reasons. Instead, the motive is veiled behind apparently neutral remarks about business necessity,
an employee's inadequate performance, attitude and the like.").
7. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987); J. KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY (1970).
8. The subordination of women and minorities, particularly blacks, in the United States, of course,
has different historical roots and sometimes takes different forms. Compare D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980); D. BELL, AND WE APE NOT SAVED (1987); A. HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN
THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1978); M. BERRY, BLACK RESISTANCE/
WHITE LAW (1971); E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1976); E. FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877 (1988) with L. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE
REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1986); E. DuBols, FEMINISM AND
SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1848-1869 (1978);
A. KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT To WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (1982);
J. JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY
TO THE PRESENT (1985) (recounting the weight of racial prejudice compounded by sexual prejudice). Prior
to the enactment of the fourteenth amendment, blacks were not citizens under state or federal law. See, e.g.,
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509 (1846). This denial
of citizenship to blacks and native Americans at the federal level was accomplished by the framers of the
United States Constitution. See Claiborne, Black Men, Red Men, and the Constitution of 1787: A Bicenten-
nial Apology from a Middle Templar, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269 (1988) (Constitution affirmed status
of blacks as chattels and native Americans as aliens in their own land). White women were not completely
excluded from the body politic, but the right to vote was restricted to propertied adult males. See R.STOREY,
OUR UNALIENABLE RIGHTS 47-49 (1965). Thus, it took the fifteenth amendment for blacks and the nineteenth
amendment for women before they could vote. Black women have been placed in a super-subordinate posi-
tion from early on. See, e.g., A. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS 23 (1983) (black slave women often
received harsher treatment than their male counterparts). Racist ideology and hegemony continues to affect
the use of anti-discrimination laws. See Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988). One commentator suggests a frame-
work for incorporation of an "anti-subordination principle into all equal protection analysis." This analysis
rejects policies that, even if facially neutral, perpetuate historical subordination of groups. Colker, Anti-
Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986). See also R.
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 386-87 (1986) (Professor Dworkin's "banned sources" theory is similar to Profes-
sor Colker's anti-subordination principle. "The banned sources theory would distinguish between affirma-
tive action programs designed to help blacks and Jim Crow laws designed to keep them in a state of economic
and social subjugation.").
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ly impeded equal opportunities throughout society and in the working life of
this country. 9 The statute was the product of decades of black struggle 10 which
culminated in the political and social agitation of the late 1950s and early 1960s
led by the black church and student civil rights movement. 11 The grassroots'
9. The economic disparities between whites and blacks were substantial in 1963 when the legislation
that subsequently became the 1964 Civil Rights Act was introduced. For example, the median average wage
for black males was 59.9% that of whites and 50.3% for black women. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2514. The unemployment rate of
non-whites in 1962 was 124% higher than the rate for whites. Id. at 2513. Blacks were almost totally exclud-
ed from professional and higher-paying jobs. For example, only .5% of all professional engineers were non-
white. 110 CONG. REC. 2508 (1964) (citing Hearings Before the Gen. Subcomm. of Labor of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 445 (June 1963)). There was virtually no economic
data concerning the disparities between men's and women's income and job opportunities reported in the
committee reports, hearings and debates on the 1964 Civil Rights Act because the original bills excluded
sex as a protected category. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
The economic disparities and resultant social dislocation continue to be significant. See, e.g., Swinton,
Economic Status of Blacks 1987, in NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1988 (1988).
For example, the per capita income of blacks was 58.3% that of whites. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, MONEY, INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Table 13 (Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 157, 1986). Thirty-one percent of all persons below
the poverty level were black. Id. at Table 16. Women represented 25.1% of persons below the poverty line.
Id. Minorities and women are concentrated in lower skilled, lower paying jobs. For example, women, as
of 1980, comprised 1.6% of carpenters, 15% of production supervisors, 14.9% of sales representatives,
98.8% of secretaries, and 83.5% of cashiers. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK:
SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB (1986). Women earn only 64 cents to every dollar earned by men. U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MONEY, INCOME & POVERTY STATUS OF FAMILIES AND
PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra, at Table 13.
Blacks constitute 60% of the urban underclass in the United States. See Lauter & May, A Saga of Tri-
umph, A Return to Poverty: Black Middle Class Has Grown But Poor Multiply, L.A. Times, Apr. 2, 1988,
§ 1 at 16, col. 3. For a thorough analysis of the tremendous social dislocation afflicting the black underclass,
see W. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1987).
Although the disparities remain large, equal employment laws have had a significant positive impact
on the participation of minorities and women in the labor force. See EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF MINORITIES
AND WOMEN IN FEDERAL CONTRACTOR AND NONCONTRACTOR ESTABLISHMENTS, 1974-1980: A REPORT
OF THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR (1984) [hereinafter
EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS] (study of contractors subject to nondiscrimination and affirmative action require-
ments of Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965), in comparison to noncontractors).
10. The struggle for equality and empowerment started with the resistance of blacks to slavery. See,
e.g., E. GENOVESE, supra note 8. After emancipation, black people continued to fight subjugation and dis-
crimination. See, e.g., W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860-1880 (1935); E. FONER,
supra note 8.
11. The historical accounting of the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s continues to be exa-
mined and reexamined by historians and other social commentators. One of the most compelling accounts
is the six-part television series, Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years (PBS television broadcast,
1986) (available on videotape from Blackside, Inc., a Boston film company). The series "chronicles these
extraordinary times as segregated America is forced, in a single decade, to take a giant step from a feudal
state toward a free and open democracy." J. WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS,
1954-1965 (1987). The words of the leaders of what has been called the Second Reconstruction, from their
common ground and different perspectives, offer a unique view of this period. See, e.g., S. CARMICHAEL
& C. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA (1967); J. FARMER, LAY BARE
THE HEART: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1985); J. FORMAN, THE MAKING OF
BLACK REVOLUTIONARIES; A PERSONAL ACCOUNT (1972); M. KING, STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM: THE MONT-
GOMERY STORY (1958); R. WILKENS, STANDING FAST: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROY WILKINS (1982). The
role of the black church, particularly the efforts of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and key
events in 1963 and 1964 are among many aspects examined in a comprehensive treatment of this period.
See D. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP
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organizing and demands for freedom and empowerment were complemented
by courtroom challenges to segregation and Jim Crowism which asserted the
guarantees of the Constitution, particularly the fourteenth amendment. 1 2
Each year from 1943 until 1964, a bill prohibiting discrimination in em-
CONFERENCE (1986) [hereinafter D. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS]. See also W. WALKER, THE SOUL OF
BLACK WORSHIP (1984). For views of the role of black students during this period, see C. CARSON, IN STRUG-
GLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960's (1981); H. ZINN, SNCC: THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS
(1964). The continued role of violence to impede those fighting for civil and human rights is another part
of the story. See, e.g., S. CAGIN & P. DRAY, WE ARE NOT AFRAID: THE STORY OF GOODMAN, SCHWERNER
AND CHANEY AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOR MISSISSIPPI (1988); D. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA:
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (1978). The use of government resources
to disrupt efforts to organize against racial oppression is a particularly sad aspect of this history. See D.
GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: FROM "SoLO" TO MEMPHIS (1981). The various presiden-
tial actors and their roles in advancing and/or impeding the march toward racial equality is another crucial
part of this period. See C. BRAUER, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1977); R. BuRK,
THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS (1984); V. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE (1971).
No view of the period would be complete without listening to the voices that chronicled the hopes, aspi-
rations and struggles of black people through poetry, novels, short stories, music and art. Langston Hughes
eloquently wrote an unpublished poem, Dream of Freedom, for the NAACP:
There is a dream in the land
With its back against the wall
By muddled names and strange
Sometimes the dream is called.
There are those who claim
This dream for theirs alone-
A sin for which, we know,
They must atone.
Unless shared in common
Like sunlight and like air,
The dream will die for lack
Of substance anywhere
The dream knows no frontier or tongue,
The dream no class or race.
The dream cannot be kept secure
In any one locked place.
This dream today embattled,
with its back against the wall-
To save the dream for one
It must be saved for all.
L. Hughes, Dream of Freedom (Apr. 1, 1964) (unpublished poem). See Edwards, The Annual John Ran-
dolph Tucker Lecture: The Future of Affirmative Action in Employment, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 763,
763-64 (1987). See also L.HUGHES, SELECTED POEMS (1959); T. MORRISON, BELOVED (1987); A. WALK-
ER, MERIDIAN (1976).
12. The legal assault on the "separate but equal" doctrine articulated in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896) began in 1938 when the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the denial of legal education
to blacks in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). Concerted legal challenges were led
by black attorneys such as Charles Houston, Thurgood Marshall, Robert Carter and Constance Baker Motley.
For a biography of Charles Houston, see G. McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983). The NAACP, most often the organization leading the way, was
joined by the Urban League, the American Jewish Congress and the American Civil Liberties Union. See
Lytle, The History of the Civil Rights Bill of 1964, 4 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 275, 279 (1966). Missouri ex rel.
Gaines was followed by Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (black appli-
cant entitled to secure legal education); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (black person denied admis-
sion to University of Texas School of Law and admitted to newly established law school for blacks, denied
equal protection of laws); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (black graduate stu-
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ployment was introduced in Congress. 13 The power of the committee chair-
men, southern Democrats who were often staunch segregationists, and the
effective tool of the filibuster, 14 ensured defeat for this proposed legislation.
As the organizing and plans for the historic August 28, 1963 March on Washing-
ton neared completion, I I President Kennedy submitted a proposed Civil Rights
Act to Congress. The proposal did not contain a fair employment provision;
the Administration feared that the inclusion of such a provision would kill any
dent assigned seat in classroom and library specified for Negroes, pursuant to state law that instruction of
Negroes in higher education be "upon a segregated basis"). Other cases challenged race discrimination in
other areas of life. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (racially restrictive covenant barred); Morgan
v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (discrimination in interstate travel barred). The landmark school desegre-
gation decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) was seen by some as a catalyst for the
emergence of political agitation. See Lytle, supra, at 280 ("This [Brown] decision cloaked the civil rights
movement in a mantle of legitimacy and gave it the moral nourishment necessary to every social revolu-
tion."). For a compelling discussion of the Brown case, see R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975). For an
analysis of desegregation in the North, see P. DIAMOND, BEYOND BUSING: INSIDE THE CHALLENGE TO UR-
BAN SEGREGATION (1985); and from a social commentator's view, see J. LUKAS, COMMON GROUND (1985)
(school integration in Boston from the viewpoints of black, Irish and "Yankee" families).
The lawyers' work to protect and sustain the civil rights movement continued throughout the period.
See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (first amendment rights of free speech and association);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (right of free association part of the fourteenth amendment's
"liberty," protecting association's membership list from compelled disclosure). The tactic of sit-ins engen-
dered numerous state criminal prosecutions in which the protestors' attorneys fought back with the four-
teenth amendment and federal nondiscrimination statutory provisions. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
226 (1964) (after state and local public accommodations laws were enacted, criminal prosecutions based
on former law should be dismissed); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (conviction of 16 blacks
for disturbing the peace after refusing to move from seats reserved for whites at a lunch counter on the grounds
that there was no evidence to sustain the conviction); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (black law
students' trespass convictions for refusing to leave white section of a restaurant in Richmond bus terminal
reversed under nondiscrimination clause of Interstate Commerce Act). See also D. BELL, RACE, RACISM
AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 8, at 279-361; A. KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL 151-296 (1983) (particularly
Chapter 8 discussing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), where Louisiana unsuccessfully attempt-
ed to use its Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law to harass and prosecute the Southern Con-
ference Educational Fund).
13. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1966); EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964 7 (1973) (noting bills introduced from 1943). See also N. Schlei, Foreword, in EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW (B. Schlei & P. Grossman eds. 1983) (noting President Kennedy's belief that inclu-
sion of a fair employment provision in the proposed civil rights bill of 1963 would be too explosive-and
result in no legislation).
14. See Lytle, supra note 12, at 276-77.
15. See T. GENTILE, MARCH ON WASHINGTON: AUGUST 28, 1963 (1963); A. SCHLESINGER, A THOU-
SAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE HOUSE 969-70 (1965) (In a meeting with civil rights leaders
in June 1963, President Kennedy acknowledged "that the demonstrations in the streets had brought results;
they had made the executive branch act faster and were now forcing Congress to entertain legislation which
a few weeks before would have had no chance."). Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, now serving on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, noted the important role of political agitation in the passage
of the civil rights statutes. As a member of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Vio-
lence, in dissent he wrote:
[T]he major impetus for the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, 1964 and 1965, which promised more
equal access to the opportunities of our society, resulted from the determination, the spirit and the
nonviolent commitment of the many who continually challenged the constitutionality of racial dis-
crimination and awakened the national conscience.
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF JUDGE HIGGINBOTHAM, COMMISSION STATEMENT ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, NAT'L
COMM'N ON THE CAUSES & PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 16 (Dec. 1969).
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chances of passage of the other provisions. 16
Recognizing the critical importance of work for both economic empower-
ment and human dignity, 17 the civil rights forces pressed for an employment
provision in the proposed legislation. 18 They succeeded, and much of the de-
bate about the bill centered around the proposed Title VII. "9 The initial proposal
prohibited discrimination based upon race, religion and national origin. 2 0 Fe-
males were excluded from its protection. Although women had gained the pro-
tection of the Equal Pay Act 21 that year, it offered limited rights. 22
16. See C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985). The original bill submitted to Congress by President Kennedy contained a provi-
sion permitting the President to establish a Commission to regulate discrimination by government contrac-
tors. This provision had long ago been established by executive orders of previous presidents. See N. Schlei,
supra note 13, at ix-x. President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-43 comp.),
prohibiting discrimination in employment by defense contractors. From 1941 to 1961 successive presidents
issued executive orders proscribing employment discrimination in federal contracting. See Jones, The Origins
of Affirmative Action, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383, 392-97 (1988).
17. The March on Washington was planned as a call for "jobs and freedom." For example, John Lewis,
now a member of Congress from Georgia, was chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
in 1964 and addressed the march. Among other things, Lewis said:
We march today for jobs and freedom, but we have nothing to be proud of. For hundreds and thou-
sands of our brothers are not here. They have no money for their transportation, for they are receiv-
ing starvation wages . . . or no wages at all. While we stand here, there are sharecroppers in the
Delta of Mississippi who are out in the fields working for less than three dollars a day for twelve
hours of work.
J. FORMAN, supra note 11, at 336. Employment became an early focus of the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference. Its "Operation Breadbasket" sought jobs for blacks from target industries. The Reverend Jesse
Jackson brought this approach north to Chicago. See D. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 11, at
462-63. For a discussion of black labor and unions, see H. HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM (1985). The universal right to work, to have a decent standard of living, without distinctions of
any kind, was set out as an international aspiration by the United Nations Charter. See U.N. CHARTER art.
1, para. 2 and 3.
18. See C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, supra note 16, at 26-27, 35. The Kennedy bill was introduced into
the House of Representatives by Emanuel Celler, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, which was given
jurisdiction by the Speaker of the House. Id. at 4. An amendment containing a new and much more far-
reaching employment section was offered by Representative Peter Rodino. It established the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and conferred upon it the power to investigate, and after a hearing,
order any discriminatory practices to cease. Id. at 35. This proposal was modeled on the National Labor
Relations Act. The key Republican member of the Committee, William McCulloch, and the White House
were upset with the amendment. Id. passim. The cease and desist enforcement authority contained in this
amendment was eliminated in the final bill. Thus, the administrative process was circumvented and the fed-
eral courts were given de novo review. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1963
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2515-16. Later, the EEOC, in addition to private parties, was
given the authority to file cases in court de novo. See Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 824, 836-45 (1972).
19. See 110 CONG. REC. 1518-30 (1964).
20. See H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REC. 1511 (1964).
21. Enacted as § 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
22. The Act provides:
No employer having employees subject to [the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA] shall
discriminate, within any establishment . . ., between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages
to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees
of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions ....
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982). The Act permits differences in wages if paid pursuant to: "(i) a seniority
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production;
or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex." Id.
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Opponents of the legislation introduced an amendment to include sex as
a protected category, apparently strategizing that the spectre of opening oppor-
tunities to women in the workplace would unleash sexist forces and defeat the
entire bill. 23 The attempt failed. Thus, women joined blacks and other minori-
ties as the beneficiaries of this legislation. Invoking closure for the first time
in a filibuster against civil rights legislation, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
passed. It embodied the hope and aspirations of minorities and women for equal
and full participation in all aspects of American society.
Title VII, now twenty-five years24 a remedial mechanism to challenge job
discrimination, gained substantive strength as it evolved and has survived a con-
certed effort by the Reagan Administration to undermine its vitality. 25 Although
23. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964). Judge Howard Smith of Virginia, then Chairman of the powerful
Rules Committee and an ardent opponent of civil rights legislation, offered an amendment to include sex
after two weeks of floor debate. He and nine of the eleven members who spoke in behalf of the amendment
voted against the civil rights bill. See also Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law: Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 310-12 (1968) ("In
the context of that debate [on the Civil Rights Act of 1964] and of the prevailing Congressional sentiment
when the amendment was offered, it is abundantly clear that a principal motive in introducing it was to pre-
vent passage . . . ."); Vaas, supra note 13, at 441-42. Representative Edith Green, regarded as a champion
of equal rights for women and a member of the President's Commission on the Status of Women, opposed
treating discrimination against Women together with the proposed protected groups. 110 CONG. REC. 1511
(1964); Kanowitz, supra, at 311-12. Representative Griffiths supported the amendment, raising the spectre
that black women would be given an advantage over white women without the inclusion of sex: "I rise in
support of this amendment primarily because I feel as a white woman when this bill has passed this House
and the Senate and has been signed by the President that white women will be last at the hiring gate." 110
CONG REC. 2578 (1964). The racism exhibited by some women's rights supporters was a reminder of the
racial divisions between abolitionists and some prominent fighters for women's suffrage in an earlier era.
See E. DuBois, supra note 8, at 95-96, 100, 110 (discussing Elizabeth Cady Stanton's and Susan B. Antho-
ny's collaboration with George Francis Train, an open and virulent racist.)
24. The bill was signed on July 2, 1964, but became effective on July 5, 1965.
25. ACLU, IN CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS AND THE COURTS-THE REAGAN CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD (1984);
Chambers, Racial Justice in the 1980's, 8 CAMPBELL L. REV. 29, 31-34 (1985); Report of the Washington
Council of Lawyers, I N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTS. ANN. 199 (1983); Selig, The Reagan Justice Department
and Civil Rights: What Went Wrong, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 785; Wolvovitz & Lobel, The Enforcement of
Civil Rights Statutes: The Reagan Administration's Record, 9 BLACK L.J. 252 (1986). Associate Justice Thurgood
Marshall characterized Reagan as among the Presidents most hostile to the civil rights of blacks. See N.Y.
Times, Sept. 9, 1987, at Al, col. 1. In 1984, the Supreme Court in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) barred race-conscious layoffs. The Justice Department read the decision as
the death of race-conscious affirmative action. Chambers, supra, at 32. Led by Assistant Attorney General
for Civil Rights, William Bradford Reynolds, the Department pressured 50 cities, counties and states to abandon
goals and timetables for hiring and promotion established under consent decrees brought by the Justice Depart-
ment in the Johnson, Nixon and Carter Administrations. The attempt failed, and in the next two terms the
Supreme Court made clear that race and sex conscious affirmative remedies were lawful under Title VII
or the fourteenth amendment. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986)
(plurality) (court-ordered race-conscious goal benefiting nonvictims of discrimination in private employment);
Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (consent decree utilizing
quotas benefiting nonvictims of discrimination in public employment); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149 (1987) (plurality) (promotion quota lawful under fourteenth amendment to remedy discrimination against
blacks in Alabama State Police); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (voluntary affir-
mative action plan by public employer used sex as one factor in promotion decision). The Department of
Labor (administered by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP)) and Attorney General
Meese attempted to eliminate the use of goals and timetables in the enforcement of Exec. Order No. 11,246,
3 C.F.R. 339 (1965). This attempt also failed after widespread opposition from Congress, some sectors of
the business community and even dissent within the Reagan cabinet. See Affirmative Action: Joint Oversight
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Title VII enumerates a list of prohibited employment actions, 26 it does not de-
fine discrimination. Congress intended that the statute's remedial goals should
be interpreted broadly, 27 and the courts have liberally construed its provisions. 28
The Supreme Court developed two principal theories of discrimination and
an analytical framework for the trial courts to utilize in evaluating the evidence.
The first theory, disparate impact, articulated in Griggs v. Duke Power Com-
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary
and the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong.,
1 st Sess. 223-24 (1985) (statement of William S. McEwen, Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mittee, National Association of Manufacturers); Ellis, Victim-Specific Remedies: A Myopic Approach to Dis-
crimination, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 575, 603-04 & nn.145-48 (1984-85). The EEOC's secret
attempt to eliminate goals and timetables also was reversed. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion Policies Regarding Goals and Timetables in Litigation Remedies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. I passim
(1986); Nomination of Clarence Thomas of Missouri to be Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10,
36-58 (1986) (statement of Clarence Thomas, Chairman, EEOC).
Lastly, President Reagan has appointed to the federal judiciary ideological conservatives hostile to vic-
tims of discrimination. One study found that, although Reagan-appointed judges differed very little from
other Republican judges generally, in the area of discrimination suits they were "more extreme." Note, All
The President's Men: A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 766, 783 (1987).
26. See §§ 703 and 704, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 and -3 (1982). Unlawful employment practices are enumer-
ated covering employers, employment agencies, labor organizations and training programs. For example,
with respect to employer practices, the statute reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(l) and (2). The retaliation provision states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his em-
ployees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management com-
mittee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs,
to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any mem-
ber thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful em-
ployment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
27. See Norton, supra note 5, at 689 ("courts have regarded Title VII as a law whose framers intended
an expansive interpretation").
28. Justice Marshall explained the importance of Title VII as a remedial statute:
[11t is important to bear in mind that Title VII is a remedial statute designed to eradicate certain in-
vidious employment practices. The evils against which it is aimed are defined broadly: "to fail . . . to
hire or to discharge ... or otherwise to discriminate . . . with respect to ... compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment," and "to limit, segregate, or classify . . . in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status."
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 381 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. V 1970)). See also Parham v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1970) ("Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is
to be accorded a liberal construction in order to carry out the purpose of Congress to eliminate the incon-
venience, unfairness and humiliation of racial discrimination.").
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pany, 11 and its progeny, 30 is the high water mark of the Court's interpretation
of Title VII. The theory's focus is on the effects of employment policies or prac-
tices on protected groups. It is irrelevant whether the employer intended to dis-
criminate. It is this theory that the Supreme Court in its 1988 Term in Watson
v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust31 both strengthened and, in a plurality opinion,
began laying the groundwork for gutting a powerful engine for equal opportunity.
The second theory, disparate treatment, developed after Griggs in McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green32 and its progeny, 33 provided a structure for
challenging intentional discrimination. The plurality in Watson, among other
things, failed to recognize the significant distinctions between, and the theoret-
ical underpinning of, these two theories. Through a procedural device, the al-
location of evidentiary burdens, 3 4 the Watson plurality threatens to reverse
Griggs and create a severely weakened Title VII.
The issue presented to the Court in Watson was whether subjective criteria
applied by an employer in a promotion decision could be analyzed under the
disparate impact theory. It was clear from Griggs and its progeny that objec-
tive criteria, such as a scored test or a high school diploma requirement, could
be analyzed under the impact theory. In an eight-to-zero decision, the Court
expanded the theory to apply to subjective criteria. Justice Kennedy, not yet
appointed, took no part in the consideration or decision. However, the plurali-
ty of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, White and Scalia took a
"fresh" look at Griggs and its progeny and reinterpreted this precedent to light-
en the burden on the defendant in impact cases in general, and even more so
in subjective criteria impact cases. 35 Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Mar-
shall vigorously asserted the plurality's mischaracterization of the Court's previous
decisions. 36 Justice Stevens expressed his displeasure with the plurality ad-
dressing an issue on which certiorari was not granted. 37 Therefore, he refused
to offer an opinion on the allocation of burdens and the level of proof required.
Another proof issue was raised but not decided in Watson. The plurality
29. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For an excellent discussion of the development of the impact theory, see Blum-
rosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination,
71 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1972).
30. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977);
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
31. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
32. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
33. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S.
24 (1978); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); United States Postal Serv.
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983). The disparate treatment principles are often referred
to as the McDonnell-Burdine standard because the Burdine articulation of the order and allocation of proof
is a more precise explanation of the basic test first set out in McDonnell Douglas.
34. For an excellent discussion of burdens of proof and their impact on justice in the Title VII context,
see Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice,
34 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1981).
35. 108 S. Ct. at 2788-91.
36. Id. at 2792.
37. Id. at 2797.
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stated that the plaintiff in her prima facie case must identify the specific em-
ployment practice that is challenged. 38 This, they said, is especially important
where the employer combines subjective criteria with standardized rules or
tests. 39 Three justices disagreed. Justice Blackmun noted that such a require-
ment cannot "be turned around to shield from liability an employer whose selec-
tion process is so poorly defined that no specific criterion can be identified with
any certainty, let alone be connected to the disparate effect."
4 0
The Court granted certiorari in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 4  which
raises the allocation and standard of burdens issue. 2 Justice Kennedy may de-
termine whether Griggs is reversed.
This Article discusses the two principal theories of discrimination under
Title VII and argues that the allocation of the burden of persuasion to the em-
ployer on the issue of job-relatedness under disparate impact analysis should
remain intact and that employers should be held to the same level of proof in
validating subjective criteria as they are in validating objective criteria.
Part II of the Article contains an overview of the order and allocation of
proof in disparate impact and treatment cases, including disparate treatment "pat-
tern or practice" class actions and direct evidence cases.
Part III offers a critical examination of the legislative history of Title VII
and discusses contemporaneous construction of the statute by the government
agencies responsible for its enforcement, the theoretical and practical distinc-
tions between the impact and treatment models, and the public policy underly-
ing the development of these models. The basic thesis advanced in Part III is
that the shifting of the burden of persuasion to the employer after a demonstra-
tion of a prima facie case by the plaintiff in a disparate impact case is vital to
effectuating the goal of creating a society that provides equal employment op-
portunities.
38. Id. at 2788. Justice Kennedy agreed with this view in American Fed'n of State, County & Mun.
Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405-06 (9th Cir. 1985) (Kennedy, J.) (impact analysis limited
to challenge of "a specific, clearly delineated employment practice applied at a single point in the job selec-
tion process"; "decision to base compensation on the competitive market, rather than on a theory of com-
parable worth, involves the assessment of a number of complex factors not easily ascertainable, an assessment
too multifaceted to be appropriate for disparate impact analysis").
39. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788.
40. Id. at 2797 n.10.
41. 810 F.2d 1477, vacated and remanded, 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. granted, 108
S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
42. 56 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1988) (No. 87-1387). The questions the Court will address are:
(1) Does statistical evidence that shows only concentration of minorities in jobs not at issue fail, as
a matter of law, to establish disparate impact of hiring practices where employer hires for at-issue
jobs from outside workforce and does not promote from within or provide training for such jobs,
and where minorities are not underrepresented in at-issue jobs? (2) Did court below, in applying dis-
parate impact analysis, improperly alter burdens of proof and engage in impermissible fact-finding
in disregard of established precedent? (3) Did court below permit error in allowing employees to
challenge cumulative effect of wide range of alleged employment practices under disparate impact
model?
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Part IV examines the basis for applying psychometric principles to the vali-
dation of subjective criteria. Psychological and testing literature provided many
insights in developing this part. Acceptance of this approach will substantially
advance the effective enforcement of a national policy against discrimination
in the workplace.
II. THE PRINCIPAL THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION-
DISPARATE IMPACT AND DISPARATE TREATMENT
The Supreme Court has developed two principal theories of discrimina-
tion under Title VII. The disparate impact theory focuses on the effect that an
employment policy or practice has on a protected group. The disparate treat-
ment theory is used to determine whether a particular person was intentionally
discriminated against. The theories serve different purposes. The United States,
as amicus curiae in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio43 urges the Court to
"recognize a parallelism between disparate impact and disparate treatment anal-
ysis." 44 Adoption of this argument would defeat a central purpose of Title VII.
The two theories, including the order and allocation of proof previously deve-
loped by the Court and the theoretical foundations, are set out in this section.
A. Disparate Impact-A Group-Based Concept of Equality
Disparate4" impact cases involve facially neutral selection devices or criteria
that disproportionately affect members of a protected group. 46 Neutral factors
contain no specific reference to any protected group. The selection devices may
be standardized47 ("objective"), subjective 48 ("discretionary"), or a combina-
tion of both. 49 Objective criteria include educational requirements; 1o employ-
43. 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
44. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 28, Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio (1988) (No. 87-1387).
45. The terms "disparate" and "adverse" impact are used interchangeably by the courts without any ap-
parent difference in definition or application.
46. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n. 15 (1977) ("Claims of dis-
parate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress 'disparate impact.' The latter involve employ-
ment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly
on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.").
47. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (written examination); New York City Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (drug policy); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight
requirements); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (constitutional challenge; written test of verbal
skills); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (written aptitude test); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (high school diploma and intelligence test).
48. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988) (subjective judgment of supervisors
of candidates for promotion). See also Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1479 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988) (employer hired for higher paying jobs individual "best for the job").
49. 108 S. Ct. at 2786. The Court noted that selection systems that combined both "subjective" and "ob-
jective" criteria would generally be considered subjective.
50. See, e.g., Walls v. Mississippi Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 730 F.2d 306 , 316-17 (5th Cir. 1984) (col-
lege degree requirement for Social Worker I; high school diploma or its equivalent for clerk-typist).
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ment tests; 1  height and weight requirements; 52 experience requirements; 1 3
arrest and conviction records; 54 credit, garnishment and bankruptcy records; 
5
drug history; 56  dress requirements 57  and physical requirements. 8  Subjec-
tive criteria include attitude, initiative, personality, ability to take directions,
alertness and ability to communicate. 19 Proof of discriminatory motive is not
required, 6 0 except possibly at the "pretext" stage.61 Statistical evidence is es-
sential to a prima facie case. 
6 2
The Supreme Court defined a three-step order and allocation of proof in
the seminal case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 63 and its progeny, especially
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 64 First, (prima facie case) on the basis of proba-
51. See, e.g., Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 1983) (Employment tests
are "the kind of employment practice to which the disparate impact model traditionally has applied.").
52. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
53. See, e.g., Walker v. Jefferson County Home, 726 F.2d 1554 (1 th Cir. 1984) (requirement of prior
supervisory experience for position of housekeeping department supervisor).
54. See, e.g., Avant v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 716 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir. 1983); McCray v. Alex-
ander, 29 FEP Cases 653, 658 (D. Colo. 1982).
55. See, e.g., Keenan v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 707 F.2d 1274 (1 lth Cir. 1983).
56. See, e.g., Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
57. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
929 (1980).
58. See, e.g., Berkman v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 705 F.2d 584
(2d Cir. 1983) (physical agility test for firefighters). See also Berkman v. City of New York, 812 F.2d 52
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987).
59. See, e.g., Green v. USX Corp., 570 F. Supp. 254, 260 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd inpart, rev'd in part,
843 F.2d 1511 (3d Cir. 1988).
60. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("but good intent or absence of discriminatory
intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds'
for minority groups .... But Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment
practices, not simply the motivation.").
61. See infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
62. Statistical proof has developed into a complex and sophisticated process. It requires the assistance
of statisticians, labor market economists and computer experts. Because of the tremendous cost and time
required, many private litigants are forced to forego the benefits of Title VII. The use of statistics raises
questions concerning the proper source of statistics (e.g., applicant flow v. labor market), geographic scope
(e.g., Nationwide v. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, etc.), time frame (e.g., before or after suit was
filed) and the weight (e.g., two or three standard deviations). Wards Cove raises the issue of the appropriate
source of statistics in determining whether plaintiffs made out a prima facie case. This issue is not discussed
in this article. For a range of discussion on statistical proof, see D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF
OF DISCIMINATION (1980 & Cum. Supp. 1987); Rossein, Statistical Proof in Employment Discrimination
Litigation: Use and Requirements, in CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES HANDBOOK (Lobel
ed. 1986); Braun, Statistics and the Law: Hypothesis Testing and Its Application to itle VII Cases, 32 HASTINGS
L.J. 59 (1980) (use of chi square test); Cohen. Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World
of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1985); Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple
Regression Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 737 (1980); Fisher, Multiple
Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980); Laycock, Statistical Proof and Theories
of Discrimination, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 97 (1986); Meier, Sacks & Zabell, What Happened in Hazel-
wood: Statistics, Employment Discrimination and the 80% Rule, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 139 (1984)
(critical evaluations by statisticians of the use of the binonial significance test); Shoben, Differential Pass-
Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1978) (criticiz-
ing EEOC's 80% rule).
63. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For a discussion of the development of the impact theory, see Blumrosen,
supra note 29.
64. 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); New York City Transit Auth.
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
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tive statistics presented by the plaintiff, does the employment practice have a
disparate impact on the protected group of which the plaintiff is a member?
The burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff. The employer may challenge the
statistical proof at this stage. Second, (business necessity or job-relatedness)
if the requisite impact is established by the plaintiff, has the employer met its
burden of persuasion 5 by proving that the practice is "job related" or consti-
tutes a "business necessity?" Third, (alternative selection devices) if "job-
relatedness" or "business necessity" is established by the employer, are there
alternative means of selection that would serve the employer's needs without
an adverse impact on the protected group, or is the employer's defense of the
challenged selection device a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination? The
burden of persuasion should be on the employer.
1. Prima Facie Case
To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must first identify a facially
neutral practice or an aggregation of practices and then must prove that the
challenged employment policy or practice disproportionately impacts on a pro-
tected group. 6  Generally, statistical evidence that establishes a disparity
6 7
65. This article will demonstrate that the Supreme Court's decisions have squarely placed the burden
of persuasion on the employers and that the plurality's "reinterpretation" in Watson, if accepted in Wards
Cove, would be a reversal. An often cited treatise, B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAW 1325 (2d ed. 1983), asserts that there is a question whether the burden on the defendant is one
of persuasion or production. As discussed infra notes 77-90 and accompanying text, this is a misreading
of the cases. In the 1983-85 Cumulative Supplement, the authors appear to back away from this view when
they state that "the burden shifts to the employer to justify that practice by showing a relationship to the
employment in question." Id. at 314 (Cum. Supp. 1983-85) (emphasis added). However, review of even
the cases it cites for this articulation of the burden makes clear that the burden is one of persuasion. Id.
at 314 n. 135. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Bounds, 752 F.2d 500, 503 (10th Cir. 1985) ("Once the plaintiff makes
a prima facie showing that a practice has an adverse impact, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that
the practice is mandated by business necessity.") (emphasis added); Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d
994, 997 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Once a prima facie violation has been established, the burden shifts to the em-
ployer to justify the particular employment practice.") (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971)) (emphasis added); Walker v. Jefferson County Home, 726 F.2d 1554, 1558 (1lth Cir. 1984) ("The
burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove business necessity and rebut the plaintiffs prima facie
case.") (citations omitted); Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 1986) (The employer may "rebut"
a prima facie case "by showing that the practice complained of is required by business necessity.").
66. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-32; Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425; Dothard, 433 U.S. at 328-30.
67. The degree of disparity has not been defined exactly, but in Watson seven justices agreed that the
disparities must be "sufficiently substantial." 108 S. Ct. at 2788-89; 2792 n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment). The Court has characterized the "sufficiency" differently. See Griggs,
401 U.S. at 426 ("requirements [that] operate[d] to disqualify Negroes at a substantially higher rate than
white applicants"); Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425 ("that the tests in question select applicants for hire or pro-
motion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants"); Dothard, 433 U.S.
at 329 (employment criteria that "select applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory pattern"); Beaz-
er, 440 U.S. at 584 ("statistical evidence showing that an employment practice has the effect of denying
the members of one race equal access to employment opportunities"); Teal, 457 U.S. at 446 ("significantly
discriminatory impact"). The courts have primarily relied upon three statistical tests. One, if the difference
between the expected and observed number of protected group members is greater than two or three stan-
dard deviations. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 n.14 (1977) (citing
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between the race or sex of the group selected by the practice and the race and
sex of the group available for the job, such as the general work force, the qualified
labor market or actual applicants, 68 will be sufficient to prove that an employ-
ment practice is discriminatory. For example, if a scored test is the challenged
practice in a race case, plaintiff would introduce data comparing the pass rate
for blacks and whites; 69 or a plaintiff may challenge a skill requirement in hir-
ing by comparing the percentage of blacks in the relevant labor market to the
percentage of blacks in the workforce;"O or regression analyses when the
challenged practice includes multiple criteria such as education, experience and
performance. "
In Griggs, Duke Power Company utilized a high school diploma require-
ment and a pen-and-paper objective test to qualify employees for manual labor
jobs. "1 No special skills were required. The Court accepted the plaintiffs show-
ing of adverse impact by comparing the 34% white males in North Carolina
who had diplomas with the 12% black males who had diplomas." The dis-
parate impact of the objective test was shown through the introduction of an
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission study which indicated that a similar
test administered at another time and location resulted in a 58% pass rate for
whites and a 6% pass rate for blacks. 14
At the prima facie stage, the defendant may rebut the plaintiff's statistical
evidence by challenging the accuracy, reliability, or relevancy 7 of the statistical
evidence and/or by offering more probative evidence. 7 6 The defendant tries
to demonstrate problems with the source of statistics (e.g., applicant flow ver-
sus labor market), geographic source (e.g., Nationwide versus Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area), time frame (e.g., before suit was filed versus
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 & n. 17 (1977)). Two standard deviations corresponds to the
second widely used test, statistical significance at the .05 level, which means that "there exists, at most,
a one in 20 possibility that the observed result could have occurred by chance." Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d
1249, 1282-83 & n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The third test is based upon the EEOC's Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1987) [hereinafter Uniform Guidelines]. Adverse im-
pact is inferred if selection of protected group members is at a rate less than four-fifths of the rate at which
the group with the highest rate is selected. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1987). See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n of
New York City Police Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 940 (1981). This rule has been criticized as statistically unsound. Shoben, supra note 62.
68. See supra note 62.
69. I.e., 45% of whites but only 16% of blacks passed.
70. I.e., blacks represent 40% of the service workers in the Atlanta Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area but only 7% of the employer's workforce.
71. A multiple regression analysis is a statistical construct that measures in relation to a single dependent
variable (e.g., promotion) the effect of several independent variables (e.g., work experience, education,
performance, race, sex, age).
72. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28.
73. Id. at 430 n.6.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Fudge v. Providence Fire Dep't, 766 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1985) (small sample size defeated
plaintiff's prima facie case).
76. See, e.g., Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1984).
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after) and the weight (e.g., standard deviation).
2. Defendant's Burden to Prove Business Necessity or Job-Relatedness
Once a prima facie case sufficient to survive a Rule 4 1(b) motion7 7 is es-
tablished and the defendant fails to rebut the statistical case, the burden of per-
suasion shifts to the defendant to prove that the challenged criterion is job related
or justified by some business necessity. 78 Griggs7 9 established that a test (or
selective device) with a discriminatory impact must be shown to be job related
to survive Title VII scrutiny, but it was not until Albemarle80 that the Court
explained how a defendant may prove job-relatedness. If the defendant fails
to validate the test or a validation study does not meet the requirements of Al-
bemarle, the court must rule in favor of the plaintiff. 81 In essence, this creates
an irrebuttable presumption. Nonvalidated or insufficiently validated tests with
a disproportionate impact are unacceptable under Title VII.
In Griggs, the Court stated that "Congress has placed on the employer the
burden of showing that any given requirement . . .[has] ...a manifest rela-
tionship to the employment in question."82 Further, it noted that "[tihe touch-
stone is business necessity" and "[i]f an employment practice which operates
to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice
is prohibited."8 3  In Albemarle, the Court relied on the Uniform Guidelines on
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) states, in relevant part:
After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of
his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is
not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff
has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judg-
ment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.
If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as
provided in Rule 52(a).
(emphasis added). A district court ruling on a Rule 41(b) motion "is not to make any special inferences in
the plaintiff's favor. . . .Instead it is to weigh the evidence, resolve any conflicts in it, and decide for itself
where preponderance lies." C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2371, at 224-25
(1971) (citations omitted). For a directed verdict in a jury case, FED. R. Civ. P. 50 applies. Most Title VII
cases are tried without a jury because the statute does not provide that right. See §§ 706(3)-(5), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-5(f)(3)-(5) (1982). Title VII focuses on equitable relief. The Supreme Court expressed approval
of this consensus view in Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375 (1979)
(no right to a jury trial under Title VII "[b]ecause the Act expressly authorizes only equitable remedies").
Back pay is considered essentially "legal damages" and an integral part of equitable relief. See, e.g., Slack
v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975). When claims are brought under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the plaintiff is seeking punitive damages, jury trials are available on all factual
issues determining the legal claim under §§ 1981 and 1983 and on the common issues of fact related to
Title VII. See, e.g., Thomas v. Resort Health Related Facility, 539 F. Supp. 630, 634 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
78. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("The touchstone is business necessity. If
an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job perfor-
mance, the practice is prohibited.") (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 432 (the employer has "the burden of showing that any given requirement [has] . ..a manifest
relationship to the employment in question").
80. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
81. For a discussion of validating subjective criteria, see infra notes 216-58 and accompanying text.
82. 401 U.S. at 432.
83. Id. at 431.
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Employee Selection Procedures issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the Departments of Justice and Labor and the Civil Service Com-
mission, which set out standards for validating tests. "4 The Court noted that
the Guidelines were not administrative "regulations" promulgated pursuant to
formal procedures established by Congress85 but stated that they constitute "'[t]he
administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency,' and conse-
quently they are 'entitled to great deference."' 8
The standard for proof of job-relatedness was articulated in Albemarle:
"[D]iscriminatory tests are impermissible unless shown, by professionally ac-
cepted methods, to be 'predictive of or significantly correlated with important
elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs
for which candidates are being evaluated.' "87 In a later case, Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 88 the Court invalidated a height and weight requirement for prison guards
that disproportionately excluded women applicants and was not proven to be
"job related." The Court required that "the employer must meet 'the burden of
showing that any given requirement [has] . . . a manifest relationship to the
employment in question.'"89 However, in a footnote often cited by lower courts,
84. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1988) [hereinafter Uniform Guidelines].
Validity refers to the degree to which a test correlates with a relevant measure or criterion of job
performance. Unless those people who score relatively high on a test are also likely to perform better
on the job, a test lacks validity for that purpose and is useless for selecting personnel for the job
in question.
J. KIRKPATRICK, TESTING AND FAIR EMPLOYMENT 6-7 (1968).
85. Section 713(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1982), authorizes the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission to issue procedural regulations in conformity with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § §
551-59 (1982). The Guidelines address substantive issues.
86. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34).
The extent to which the Court is willing to accord deference to the Commission's interpretations varies. Chief
Justice Burger, who authored Griggs, distinguished Albemarle on the grounds that the Guidelines supplemented
rather than interpreted specific statutory language. 422 U.S. at 451-52. The Court in Meritor Sav. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) relied upon the Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1985),
in holding that a claim of "hostile" sexual environment is actionable under Title VII, even though the victim
has not been denied a tangible job benefit. The Affirmative Action Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1608 (1985),
were approvingly referred to in Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986) and Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986). But see General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), in which the Court rejected the EEOC's Sex Discrimination
Guidelines with respect to pregnancy. This decision was overturned by Congress' enactment of the 1978
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, § 701(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (1982). See also Ansonia Bd. of Educ.
v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986) (Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605
(1987) inconsistent with the statute "[t]o the extent that the guidelines ... require the employer to accept
any alternative favored by the employee short of undue hardship"). Other courts have sanctioned the Guide-
lines. See, e.g., Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Uniform
Guidelines); Berkman v. City of New York, 705 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1983), affd in part, rev'd in par, 812
F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1987) (Uniform Guidelines); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 697 F.2d 810 (8th Cir.
1983) (Uniform Guidelines); United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (National Origin
Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (1987)); Ensley Branch of NAACP v. Seibels, 616 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1980)
(Uniform Guidelines); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981) (Uniform Guidelines).
87. 422 U.S. at 431 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)).
88. 433 U.S. 321, 322 (1977).
89. Id. at 329 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
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the Supreme Court expanded this requirement when it wrote that "a discriminatory
employment practice must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job
performance to survive a Title VII challenge.""
Many courts use "job related" and "business necessity" as interchangeable
standards and the courts of appeals have adopted different terms used by the
Supreme Court. 91 Often courts assign general definitions to these terms. The
most illuminating discussions occur in relation to the specific factual contexts
of the cases. For example, two distinctly different theories of business necessi-
ty are articulated in the Ninth Circuit's decisions in Contreras v. City of Los
Angeles9" and Blake v. City of Los Angeles. 93 The Ninth Circuit in Blake and
other courts 94 have held that the employer must prove that the practice literal-
ly is necessary to the operation of the business. Contreras adopted a considera-
bly more lenient standard. The employer need only show a legitimate business
purpose for the practice and that the practice does serve the purpose. The United
States as amicus curiae in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio urges the Court
90. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332 n.14.
91. See, e.g., Aguilera v. Cook County Police & Corrections Merit Bd., 760 F.2d 844, 847 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 907 (1985) (practice must be "reasonable" or "efficient"); Wambheim v. J.C. Penney
Co., 705 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th Cir 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984) (citation omitted) (practice
must have "'legitimate and overriding business justifications' "); Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 690
F.2d 88, 93-94 (6th Cir. 1982); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1016-17 (11 th
Cir. 1982); Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1262 (6th Cir. 1981) ("indispensabili-
ty is not the touchstone"; "practice must substantially promote the proficient operation of the business");
Williams v. Colorado Springs School Dist., 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981) ("practice must be essential,
the purpose compelling"); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981) (practice must bear a "manifest relationship to the . . .employment"); Kirby v.
Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 703, 705 n.6 (8th Cir. 1980) (practice must be shown to be necessary
to safe and efficient job performance; and there must be a compelling need for the employer to maintain
the practice); Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1389 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 441 U.S. 968 (1979) (citation and emphasis omitted) (practice must "'foster safety and efficien-
cy . .. [and] be essential to that goal'"); Kinsey v. First Regional Sec., Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 837 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (citation omitted) (practice must have an "'overriding legitimate business purpose such that the
practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business' ").
92. 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982).
93. 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979).
94. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971). The court wrote:
[T]he applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business purpose for adhering to a challenged
practice. The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the prac-
tice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must
be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively car-
ry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable alterna-
tive policies or practices which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish
it equally well with a lesser differential racial impact.
In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971) the court noted that "[n]ecessi-
ty connotes an irresistable demand . . . .[A practice] must not only directly foster safety and efficiency
of a plant, but also be essential to those goals." Accord EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 332
(8th Cir. 1986); Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d 88, 93-94 (6th Cir. 1982); Jackson v. Sea-
board Coast Line R.R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1016-17 (1 th Cir. 1982); Williams v. Colorado Springs School
Dist., 641 F.2d 835, 840-42 (10th Cir. 1981); Kinsey v. First Regional Sec., Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 837 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 245-47 (5th Cir. 1974).
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to "adopt a single governing formulation"95 and points to the "legitimate busi-
ness reasons" 96  standard articulated by the plurality in Watson as the best
standard.
In Contreras, the City would not have satisfied the higher standard of Blake.
For example, one of the plaintiffs had successfully performed an auditor's job
for a year and a half before being required to take a test for the position, result-
ing in her losing the job.
These contrasting views raise fundamental issues about Title VII. Should
Title VII be construed to prevent an employer from improving the quality of
its work force even if not absolutely necessary to its business? On the other
hand, a theoretically superior group of employees may not in fact be any better
at performing the tasks of a job than employees who are merely adequate. In
that situation, the selection criterion imposing the higher standard should not
be tolerated when it has an adverse impact on a protected group of employees.
The courts appear to be balancing the importance of the challenged practice
to the employer's operation against the injury sustained by the plaintiff class.
Unguided subjective criteria utilized by employers in hiring and in other
employment decisions are recognized by the courts as creating an inference of
discrimination. 97 The leading case, Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 11 estab-
lished early on a healthy skepticism of subjective criteria which, when applied
to protected group members, result in a disproportionate number of adverse
employment decisions. However, the nature of the job involved influences the
quantum of subjectiveness the court will tolerate before it is willing to con-
clude that a presumption of discrimination has been established. 99 For instance,
subjective criteria applied to hiring decisions for jobs involving little skill, pri-
or training or experience 100 are more often seen as discriminatory than when
95. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 23, Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio (No. 87-1387).
96. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2790 (1988).
97. See, e.g., Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1525 (11th Cir. 1985) ("subjective practices such as
interviews and supervisor recommendations are capable of operating as barriers to minority advancement");
Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1181 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[sjubjective rating systems have a clear poten-
tial for abuse and may hide race or sex discrimination"); Burrus v. United Tel. Co. of Kan., Inc., 683 F.2d
339 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982) (subjective criteria provides an opportunity for unlawful
discrimination).
98. 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972) ("All we do today is recognize that promotion/transfer proce-
dures which depend almost entirely upon the subjective evaluation and favorable recommendation of the
immediate foreman are a ready mechanism for discrimination against Blacks much of which can be covertly
concealed and, for that matter, not really known to management."). A major concern in Rowe was that the
supervisors responsible for the decisions were virtually all white. Id.
99. See Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1982) (criti-
cizes differential standards as elitist, with no legal basis for distinguishing between upper and lower level
selection methods). See also Shidaker v. Bolger, 593 F. Supp. 823, 834 (N.D. I11. 1984), rev'd in part on
other grounds sub nom. Shidaker v. Carlin, 782 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[Tjhe validity of subjective devices
increases in direct proportion to the level of employment sought.").
100. See, e.g., Green v. United States Steel Corp., 570 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd and rev'd
in part, 843 F.2d 1511 (3d Cir. 1988) (laborer position in steel mill).
1988]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
those criteria are used to fill upper level management, professional or academ-
ic positions. 101
Some decisions suggest that the courts are more willing to defer to the em-
ployer's job-relatedness explanation when the job calls for the exercise of judg-
ment and subjective skills involving public safety. 102 For example, in Davis
v. City of Dallas, 103 plaintiffs challenged a police department's requirement
that applicants for the force have completed at least 45 semester hours of col-
lege credit with at least a "C" average. Black applicants were adversely affect-
ed. No empirical data was offered by the defendant to show that officers with
college credits performed their duties better than officers without such educa-
tion. The department had previously required a high school diploma. The defen-
dant "validated" the requirement by offering expert testimony that college
education "fill[ed] the gap of inexperience in the handling of a crisis situation
for an unexperienced officer."' 4
The court of appeals was not terribly bothered by the lack of empirical data
in affirming the district court's finding that the City met its burden under Griggs,
noting that: "[blecause of the professional nature of the job, coupled with the
risks and public responsibility inherent in the position, . . . empirical evidence
is not required to validate the job-relatedness of the educational requirement." 0
Although public safety concerns should be a factor in determining the standard
the employer must meet to show job-relatedness, it is nevertheless important
for the employer to validate the requirement through probative data. The stan-
dard that should be applied in subjective criteria cases is set out later in this
Article.
101. See, e.g., Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 1984) (academic tenure claim) ("Courts,
moreover, are understandably reluctant to review the merits of a tenure decision . . . . [T]riers of fact can-
not hope to master the academic field sufficiently to review the merits of such views and resolve the differ-
ences of scholarly opinion.") (citation ommitted); Mason v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 361 (7th
Cir. 1983) (managerial position); Burrus v. United Tel. Co. of Kan., 683 F.2d at 339 (10th Cir. 1982) (ac-
countant). See also Note, The Double-Edged Sword of Academic Freedom: Cutting the Scales of Justice in
Title V11 Litigation, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 445 (1987) (note argues that the courts' deference to academic institu-
tions imposes unreasonable burdens on the plaintiff).
102. See, e.g., Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1972) in which the court
addressed the issue of whether a college degree requirement for the position of flight officer, among others,
was job related:
When a job requires a small amount of skill and training and the consequences of hiring an unquali-
fied applicant are insignificant, the courts should examine closely any pre-employment standard or
criteria which discriminate against minorities. In such a case, the employer should have a heavy bur-
den to demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that his employment criteria are job-related. On the other
hand, when the job clearly requires a high degree of skill and the economic and human risks involved
in hiring an unqualified applicant are great, the employer bears a correspondingly lighter burden to
show that his employment criteria are job-related . . . . The courts, therefore, should proceed with
great caution before requiring an employer to lower his pre-employment standards for such a job.
103. 777 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1116 (1986).
104. Id. at 222.
105. Id. at 217.
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Few cases proceed past Stage Two, the job-relatedness or business neces-
sity requirement.
3. Opportunity to Show Alternative Selection Device
However, the third step or surrebuttal stage allows the plaintiff an oppor-
tunity to overcome the defendant's proof of job-relatedness by showing that a
less discriminatory alternative selection device would also serve the employ-
er's interest. It is not clear who has the burden of persuasion at this step. The
Supreme Court in Albemarle wrote that, if job-relatedness is shown, "it remains
open to the complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices, without
a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate
interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship.' "106
There is a split in the circuits on which party has the burden of proof. 107
The EEOC's Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures place the
burden on the defendant. '08 It is appropriate for the employer to retain the burden
of proving the absence of suitable alternative selection devices, both because
the employer best knows its own particular needs and because the job-relatedness
step is in the nature of an affirmative defense as to which the defendant gener-
ally bears the burden of persuasion. 109
The showing that a less discriminatory alternative selection device would
also serve the employer's interest implies that the employer's choice was in-
fluenced by the discriminatory impact of the selection device; in other words,
that the selection device is a pretext for discrimination. In Connecticut v. Teal,
the Court wrote that if an employer meets its job-relatedness burden "the plain-
tiff may prevail, if he shows that the employer was using the practice as a mere
106. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (citation omitted). See also Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (citing the language in Albemarle).
107. Compare Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1980) (employer asserting busi-
ness necessity defense must prove that there is no alternative to the challenged practice) and Blake v. City
of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980) (defendant must
demonstrate that there are no alternative devices which would equally or better accomplish the defendant's
business purpose) with Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1261 (6th Cir. 1981) ("The
burden of establishing the presence of available alternatives, however, belongs only to the plaintiff and must
be sustained in the third stage of the analysis."). See also Friedman, Redefining Equality, Discrimination,
and Affirmative Action Under Title VII: The Access Principle, 65 TEX. L. REV. 41, 49-51 n.40 (1986) (argu-
ing that the employer should have the duty to "make a reasonable investigation of less discriminatory alterna-
tives but not subjecting it to liability when the plaintiff can unearth an alternative device not detected by
such a reasonable investigation").
108. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3B (1986). It reads in relevant part:
[T]he user should include ... an investigation of suitable alternative selection procedures and suita-
ble alternative methods of using the selection procedure which have as little adverse impact as possi-
ble, to determine the appropriateness of using or validating them in accord with these guidelines.
Whenever the user is shown an alternative selection procedure with evidence of less adverse impact
and substantial evidence of validity for the same job in similar circumstances, the user should inves-
tigate it to determine the appropriateness of using or validating it in accord with these guidelines.
109. See Belton, supra note 34.
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pretext for discrimination." 110 Thus, it appears that intent does play a role in
what is a non-intent related form of discrimination. Intent is irrelevant at the
prima facie and job-related stages of proof. The third step, however, does not
focus on animus or state of mind in the same sense as in disparate treatment cases.
B. Disparate Treatment-An Intentional Discrimination Concept
Disparate treatment under Title VII involves treating individuals different-
ly on the basis of their race, color, sex, national origin or religion. I A dis-
parate treatment case is usually an individual case focused on the employer's
discriminatory motive. The plaintiff attempts to prove intentional bias, and the
employer asserts a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employment de-
cision. When the claim is that the employer's treatment of the plaintiff is part
of a pattern and practice of discrimination against members of the plaintiff's
protected class, a class action theory of treatment is available. The Supreme
Court's conceptual framework for the order and allocation of proof was set out
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 1 12 and its progeny. 13 The tripartite
standard for establishing whether or not different treatment based upon the plain-
tiff's protected status exists, is as follows: (1) the plaintiff must establish a prima
facie case; (2) the defendant must articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminato-
ry reason for the employment action; and (3) the plaintiff must then prove that
the defendant's reason was a mere pretext for discrimination. 11 4
The burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff under the McDonnell
Douglas model. 115 The defendant has a burden of production. 116 Some cir-
cuits hold that upon a plaintiff's presentation of direct evidence of discrimina-
tion the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant. 117 The Supreme Court
110. 457 U.S. 440, 447 (1982).
111. The Supreme Court articulated the conceptual theory of a disparate treatment case in International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) (citation omitted).
Disparate treatment . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply
treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national
origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from
the mere fact of differences in treatment.
112. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
113. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24
(1978); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); United States Postal Serv.
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983). See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
114. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
115. 411 U.S. at 802. The McDonnell Douglas Court stated that "[t]he complainant in a Title VII trial
must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case . . . ." (emphasis added).
Thus it was less than clear until its progeny that the burden of persuasion remained with the plaintiff throughout
the tripartite standard.
116. See Belton, supra note 34.
117. Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1987); Blalock v. Metal Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703,
712 (6th Cir. 1985); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Bell v. Birmingham
Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552 (1 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984). Contra Sims v. Cleland,
813 F.2d 790 (6th Cir. 1987).
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held in an age discrimination case that "the McDonnell test is inapplicable where
the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination."' 18 Those courts which
support the shift of the burden of persuasion argue that the McDonnell Douglas
analysis was intended for cases where direct evidence of discrimination is lack-
ing. 119 The reason these courts present for placing the burden of persuasion
on the defendant upon the introduction of direct evidence is that such evidence
squarely addresses the intent element of disparate treatment. Thus, the defen-
dant's burden to rebut the plaintiff's case is proportionately greater. When the
plaintiff offers direct evidence, the trier omits separate analyses of the plain-
tiff's prima facie case and the defendant's articulation of a nondiscriminatory
reason and proceeds immediately to a consideration of pretext.
The McDonnell Douglas tripartite formula in reality is most often not trifur-
cated. Rather the trier considers all three steps simultaneously: plaintiff presents
the prima facie case and anticipates the defendant's reasons for the actions. Thus,
at this stage the plaintiff's burden of showing pretext "merges with the ultimate
burden of persuading the court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of inten-
tional discrimination." 120
1. Prima Facie Case
The structure of the prima facie case is set out in McDonnell Douglas 1
21
and may be established by circumstantial evidence. The four elements include:
(1) plaintiff is a member of a protected group; (2) plaintiff applied and was
qualified for the position; (3) plaintiff was rejected; and (4) the position re-
mained open and the employer continued to seek applicants.
McDonnell Douglas was a discharge and failure to rehire race discrimina-
tion case. The Court stated that the prima facie structure was flexible depend-
ing on the differing factual situations. 122 This basic model has been applied
in sex, 123 national origin, 124 age, 125 and disability1 26 discrimination cases.
118. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). Since the McDonnell formula has
generally been accepted by the courts in claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982) (prohibiting discrimination in employment against individuals who are at least
40 years of age, but less than 70), this proof standard should be applied by the Court in Title VII cases.
119. For an excellent discussion of direct and circumstantial evidence in which the court talks about the
difference between the nature of the evidence offered in proof, see EEOC v. Electrolux Corp., 611 F. Supp.
926 (E.D. Va. 1985).
120. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
121. 411 U.S. at 802.
122. Id. at 802 n. 13. "The prima facie case method established in McDonnell Douglas was 'never intend-
ed to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.' "United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711, 715 (1983) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
123. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248.
124. Shah v. General Elec. Co., 816 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1987).
125. Barnes v. Southwest Forest Indus., 814 F.2d 607 (1 lth Cir. 1987); Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of
America, 758 F.2d 1525 (1lth Cir. 1985).
126. Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1985).
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An example of a variation of the prima facie structure is a case of sexual harass-
ment under Title VII. "I Other examples of the adoption and/or modification
of the McDonnell Douglas model come from the range of employment deci-
sions in an employer's work force including hiring, 128 promotion, 129 job as-
signment, 130 transfer,"' compensation, 132 training, 133 discipline, 134 lay-
off, 131 discharge 136 and retaliation. 137
If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case, a "presumption"
is created that the employer unlawfully discriminated. 138 This "inference of
unlawful discrimination"1 39 is raised "only because we presume these acts, if
otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of
impermissible factors." 1 40  Thus, the stage is set for the second part of the
McDonnell Douglas allocation of proof. The defendant must produce evidence
to rebut this presumption of discrimination.
127. The District of Columbia Circuit in Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1981), held,
for instance, that the employee's prima facie case of quidpro quo sexual harassment consists of the following:
(1) that she was subjected to sexual harassment; and
(2) that she was denied a benefit [or was discharged] for which she was eligible and of which she
had a reasonable expectation.
The Supreme Court in Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) confirmed that there are two forms
of sexual harassment violative of Title VII. The first, the quid pro quo or, in other words, the "put-out-or-
get-out" demand made of a woman by someone with the power or apparent authority to hire, promote or
fire her or, in some other way, cause an adverse employment decision. The other is the "hostile environ-
ment," even where the female employee suffered no tangible adverse employment action.
128. Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590 (1lth Cir. 1987).
129. Falcon v. General Tel. Co., 815 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1987); Autry v. North Carolina Dep't of Human
Resources, 820 F.2d 1384 (4th Cir. 1987).
130. Spears v. Board of Educ. of Pike County, 843 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1988).
131. Kent County Deputy Sheriffs Ass'n v. Kent County, 826 F.2d 1485 (6th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied
sub nom. Kent County Deputy Sheriffs Ass'n v. Heffron, 835 F.2d 1146 (6th Cir. 1987).
132. Feazell v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 819 F.2d 1036 (11 th Cir. 1987); Covington v. Southern I11. Univ.,
816 F.2d 317 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987).
133. Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, 832 F.2d 194 (1st Cir. 1987).
134. Johnson v. Legal Serv. of Ark., Inc., 813 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1987).
135. Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 831 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1471 (1988).
136. Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communication, 738 F.2d 1181, reh'g denied, 747 F.2d 710 (1 th Cir.
1984).
137. The components of a prima facie case of reprisal include: (1) that she engaged in a statutorily pro-
tected activity; (2) that the employer took an adverse personnel action; and (3) that a causal connection exist-
ed between the two. Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1985); McKenna v. Weinberger, 729
F.2d 783, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted); see also Smalley v. City of Eatonville, 640 F.2d 765,
769 (5th Cir. 1981); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 622 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1980). In cases of alleged
retaliatory discharge, failure to hire or failure to promote, the plaintiff must also show as part of the prima
facie reprisal case that he was qualified for the position. Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 116-17 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); see also Irvin v. Airco Carbide, 837 F.2d 724 (6th Cir. 1987); Canino v. EEOC, 707 F.2d
468, 471-72 (11th Cir. 1983).
138. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 & nn. 8 & 9 (1981). The Burdine Court used both the terms "presump-
tion" and "inference" of discrimination. A presumption is a rule of law that assumes temporarily a certain
factual situation based on proof of other related facts. It is not evidence but a procedural device that shifts
the burden of production to the other party. A presumption is rebuttable. An inference is a process of reason-
ing that permits a deduction based on human reason and experience. The end result, like a presumption,
has the directive force of the rule of law. See C. McCoRMIcK, McCoRMICK ON EvIDENcE § 342 (3d ed.
1984); Belton, supra note 34, at 1221-23.
139. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
140. Id. at 254.
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2. Defendant's Articulation of a Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason
At the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas tripartite analysis, the defen-
dant has the intermediary burden of producing evidence to rebut the plaintiffs
prima facie case. To accomplish this, the defendant must articulate lawful rea-
sons for its employment action. 41 This burden is satisfied by the defendant
producing "admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally
to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discrimina-
tory animus."142 Or, in other words, the defendant's evidence must raise a
genuine issue of fact as to whether it intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff. 143
The proffered reason(s) must be "clear and reasonably specific."144 If the
defendant carries its burden, the factual inquiry of the ultimate question, inten-
tional discrimination, "proceeds to a new level of specificity." 4 ' Because of
this, the Burdine Court expected defendants to attempt to persuade the trier of
fact that the decision was lawful, even though the formal burden of persuasion
remained on the plaintiff. 146
3. Plaintiff's Opportunity to Prove Pretext
If the defendant meets its burden of production and since the burden of
persuasion remains with the plaintiff, the plaintiff "must have the opportunity
to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the em-
ployment decision." 4 7 Thus, the ultimate burden of proving intentional dis-
crimination converges. The plaintiff may prevail in two ways: first, by directly
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the em-
ployer; or, second, by demonstrating that the employer's asserted reason is not
credible. 148 There are three types of evidence available to the plaintiff to prove
his/her prima facie and ultimately his/her pretext case: (1) comparative; (2)
statistical; and (3) direct. A good example of the use of all three types is found
in Miles v. M.N. C. Corporation. I"
141. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802. The burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248. Further, the defendant's bur-
den must be "legally sufficient." Id. It is not clear whether the two words, "legitimate" and "nondiscriminatory,"
have separate meanings or are merely redundant.
142. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257 (emphasis added). The Court noted that the defendant could not rely on
its answer to the complaint or other evidence not admitted. Id. at 255 n.9.
143. Id. at 254-55. The Court noted that this procedural device is "intended progressively to sharpen the
inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination." Id. at 255 n.8.
144. id. at 258.
145. Id. at 255.
146. Id. at 258.
147. Id. at 256.
148. Id. See United States Postal Service Bd. of Gov's v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 717!18 (1983).
149. 750 F.2d 867 (11 th Cir. 1985).
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4. Disparate Treatment Pattern and Practice Class Actions
The claim in a disparate treatment class action is that the employer's differen-
tial treatment of the plaintiff is part of a "pattern or practice" of discriminatory
treatment toward other members of plaintiff's protected group. 150 Thus, in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 151 the Court held that
the plaintiff must "establish by a preponderance of the evidence that racial dis-
crimination was the company's standard operating procedure-the regular rather
than the unusual practice." 152  In other words, the plaintiff must show more
than "isolated or 'accidental' or sporadic discriminatory acts."
15 1
Pattern and practice plaintiffs generally establish a prima facie case upon
presentation of statistical evidence that creates an inference of classwide dis-
crimination. 114 The Supreme Court in Teamsters stated that a prima facie case
was proved where the plaintiff presented "gross" disparities between the per-
centage of blacks in the general population and the percentage in the employer's
work force, in addition to evidence of individual disparate treatment. 155
Before the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the inference of discrimi-
nation, the defendant can attempt to attack the validity of the statistics by demon-
strating that the proof is unreliable because it is inaccurate or inappropriate, 
15 6
or that the disparities are not statistically significant. Whether the burden of
persuasion or merely the burden of production shifts to the employer has not
been directly decided by the Supreme Court. However, in Teamsters, the Court
implied that it is a burden of persuasion that shifts, because upon failure of the
employer to dispel the inference of the existence of a pattern or practice of dis-
crimination, the Court will infer that all class members were victims of dis-
crimination. 157
There is a split among the courts of appeals on this issue. The Sixth Cir-
150. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The statutory source for
a "pattern or practice" suit evolved from § 707(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1982), which origi-
nally authorized the Attorney General to file civil actions in federal district courts when he had "reasonable
cause to believe that any person . . . is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment
of [Title VII]." The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 transferred these functions to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Private plaintiffs may also seek relief under the pattern and practice
theory. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
151. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
152. Id. at 336.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 339.
155. Id. at 337. The data presented by the United States showed that of almost 6,500 current employees
only 5% were black and 4% Hispanic. In the more desirable line-driver jobs, 0.4% were black and 0.3%
were Hispanic. Id.
156. Id. at 339-40 n.20. The analysis at this stage virtually parallels the presentation of statistical proof
in adverse impact cases. See supra note 62.
157. Id. at 362. "The proof of the pattern or practice supports an inference that any particular employ-
ment decision, during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of
that policy." Id.
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cuit in Lujan v. Franklin County Board of Education'58 and the Eighth Circuit
in Craik v. Minnesota State University Board "9 held that the burden of persu-
asion shifts to the defendant. In contrast, one Eleventh Circuit case, Maddox
v. Claytor, 160 held that the defendant's burden is one of production to articu-
late a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. A subsequent Eleventh
Circuit case, Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 161 took the position that
the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant.
Upon failure of the employer to dispel the plaintiff's inference, the case
proceeds to the remedial stage which addresses relief for individual class mem-
bers. 162 The employer has the burden at this stage of proving that any given
individual class member was not unlawfully discriminated against. 163
III. FOUNDATIONS OF GROUP-BASED STRUCTURE OF PROOF
The foundations of Title VII laid over the last twenty-five years were built
to reflect this country's commitment to eradicate all forms of job discrimina-
tion. The fundamental theoretical underpinnings and social goals should be
reaffirmed by maintaining the basic structure of proof developed by the Court
in disparate impact cases. Shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer
after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disproportionate impact is
warranted for the following reasons: the critical differences between individu-
al disparate treatment and group-based disparate impact cases; the legislative
history of the 1964 Act and the 1972 amendments confirms Congress' intent
that Title VII prohibits both types of discrimination; contemporaneous adminis-
trative interpretation is consistent with Congressional goals; and public policy
of opening employment opportunities to those previously excluded.
A. Congressional Goals in Enacting Title VII-Legislative
History of the 1964 Act and the 1972 Amendments
1. The 1964 Act
Congress had two principal goals in enacting Title VII. While the main
thrust, initially, was to prohibit purposeful discrimination, 164 "it was clear to
158. 766 F.2d 917, 929 (6th Cir. 1985).
159. 731 F.2d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1984).
160. 764 F.2d 1539, 1546 (1lth Cir. 1985). See also Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, 597 F. Supp. 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
161. 784 F.2d 1546, 1559 (1lth Cir. 1986).
162. 431 U.S. at 361-62.
163. See, e.g., Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1984).
164. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977) ("[u]ndoubtedly
disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII").
1988]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Congress that '[t]he crux of the problem [was] to open employment opportuni-
ties for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them,'
. . . and it was to this problem that Title VII's prohibition against racial dis-
crimination in employment was primarily addressed." 165 Eradicating intentional
discrimination and opening up opportunities historically closed served another
Congressional purpose. The committee reports and debates are replete with refer-
ences to Congress' intent to improve the economic status of blacks1 66  and the
realization that discrimination was "a pervasive practice" throughout the coun-
165. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203 (1979) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6548
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey)). One commentator suggests a third goal: to minimize governmental interfer-
ence with traditional management prerogatives. Friedman, supra note 107. While maintenance of employer
prerogatives in running their businesses has been articulated, the intervention of anti-discrimination man-
dates necessarily take primacy. Employer autonomy is reduced in light of the critical national importance
of securing equal opportunity in the workplace. An example of the concern for employer control is Weber,
443 U.S. at 206 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 29 (1963)) (noting that the com-
promises wrought in the passage of Title VII included a demand by some legislators "as a price for their
support that management prerogatives, and union freedoms . . . be left undisturbed to the greatest extent
possible").
166. For the complete text of the House congressional reports, including hearing testimony, and the House
and Senate debates recorded in 110 CONG. REC. (1964), see U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COM-
MISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1968) (reprinted 1988).
See generally C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, supra note 16; Lytle, supra note 12; Vaas, supra note 13.
For examples of congressional concern for the economic plight of black people, see, e.g., supra note
9; 110 CONG. REC. 6547-50 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Senator Humphrey, one of the floor managers
of the bill, expressed this concern:
The Negro is the principal victim of discrimination in employment. According to Labor Department
statistics, the unemployment rate among nonwhites is over twice as high as among whites. More
significantly, among male family breadwinners, those with dependents to support, the unemploy-
ment rate is three times as high among nonwhites as among whites. And although nonwhites consti-
tute only I I percent of the total work force, they account for 25 percent of all workers unemployed
for 6 months or more.
Discrimination also affects the kind of jobs Negroes can get. Generally, it is the lower paid and
less desirable jobs which are filled by Negroes. For example, 17 percent of nonwhite workers have
white collar jobs; among white workers the figure is 47 percent. On the other hand, only 4 percent
of the whites who are employed work at unskilled jobs in non-agricultural industries; among non-
whites the figure is 14 percent.
Id. at 6547. Similarly, Representative McCulloch, the ranking minority member of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee and one of the authors of H.R. 7152, the omnibus bill that subsequently became the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, noted:
In 1962, nonwhites made up 11 percent of the civilian labor force, but 22 percent of the unemployed.
Approximately 900,000 nonwhites were without jobs during the year-thereby constituting an unem-
ployment rate of 11 percent. This was more than twice the rate of white unemployed workers ....
Moreover, among Negroes who are employed, their jobs are largely concentrated among the semi-
skilled and unskilled occupations.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 27 (1963); see also Equal Employment Opportunity:
Hearings on H.R. 405 and Similar Bills Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Education
and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1963) (Rep. Cohelan stated: "The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
has reported that the limitations on employment opportunities for Negroes are reflected in their earnings;
that where the heads of families have received equivalent formal education, the median income of Negro
families is considerably less than that of white families."). Congress was also concerned that discrimination
against blacks adversely impacted on the national economy. For instance, Representative McCulloch observed:
The effect of this severe inequality in employment is felt both on the personal level and on the nation-
al level . . . . The failure of our society to extend job opportunities to the Negro is an economic
waste. The purchasing power of the country is not being fully developed. This, in turn, acts as a
brake upon potential increases in gross national product . . . . Through toleration of discriminatory
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try that "permeate[d] the national social fabric -North, South, East and West." 167
The recognition that equal employment opportunity required Congress to ad-
dress both "overt and covert discriminatory selection devices, intentional or unin-
tentional," 168 was evident. The embodiment of Congress' broad prohibition of
practices resulting in the denial of employment opportunities was contained in
section 703(a)(2) of Title VII. 169
practices, American industry is not obtaining the quantity of skilled workers it needs. With 10 per-
cent of the work force under the bonds of racial inequality, this stands to reason. Similarly, an ex-
amination of job openings that are regularly advertised discloses that the country is not making
satisfactory use of its manpower. Consider how our shortage of engineers, scientists, doctors, plum-
bers, carpenters, technicians, and the myriad of other skilled occupations could be overcome in due
time if we eliminate job discrimination.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 28 (1963). Similarly, Senator Kuchel, the co-floor manager
of H.R. 7152 in the Senate, commented:
Job discrimination because of one's race is an evil which affects not only the individual, but also
the future of a constantly expanding America, for if our economy is to continue to grow, so that
we can produce the goods and services needed to provide a better life for our fellow citizens here
at home ... then our country must utilize to the fullest the talents and skills of each of our citizens,
regardless of his race.
110 CONG. REC. 6562 (1964); see also 110 CONG. REC. 6547 (1964) (Senator Humphrey remarked, "[t]he
Council of Economic Advisers has recently estimated that full utilization of the present educational attain-
ment of nonwhites in this country would add about $13 billion to our gross national product. So, discrimina-
tion in employment ...is costing the American economy billions of dollars in loss of income.").
167. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963) ("Job discrimination is extant in almost
every area of employment and every area of this country. It ranges in degrees from patent absolute rejection
to more subtle forms of invidious distinctions. Most frequently, it manifests itself through relegation to 'tradi-
tional' positions and through discriminatory promotional practices.").
168. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1964). Senator Clark, who wrote the Senate Report and
later became one of the bipartisan Senate floor leaders for Title VII, explained:
Overt or covert discriminatory selection devices, intentional or unintentional, generally prevail through-
out the major part of the white economic community. Deliberate procedures operate together with
widespread built-in administration processes through which nonwhite applicants are automatically
excluded from job opportunities. Channels for job recruitment may be traditionally directed to sources
which by their nature do not include nonwhites; trainees may be selected from departments where
Negroes have never worked; promotions may be based upon job experience which Negroes have
never had.
Id.
Secretary of Labor Wirtz stated in his testimony before the Senate Labor Committee: "Discrimination
has become, furthermore, institutionalized so that it obtains today in some organizations and practices and
areas as the product of inertia, preserved by forms and habits which can best be broken from the outside."
Id. Language similar to § 703(a)(2) (the provision held to be the basis of the disparate impact theory) ap-
peared in S. 1937, § 4(a), a bill introduced by Senator Humphrey. It was reported favorably out of the Senate
Labor Committee. It defined "equal employment opportunity in broad terms to include a wide range of inci-
dents and facilities, and encompasse[d] all aspects of discrimination in employment because of race, color,
religion, or national origin." Id. at 10. Section 4(a) made unlawful the discriminatory denial of "equal em-
ployment opportunity," including any practice which "results or tends to result in material disadvantage or
impediment to any individual in obtaining employment or the incidents of employment for which he is other-
wise qualified." Id. at 24. Lastly, the report declared that the substantive provision was "designed specifical-
ly to reach into all of the institutionalized areas and recesses of discrimination, including the so-called built-in
practices preserved through form, habit, or inertia." Id. at 11.
169. See supra note 26 for full text of this provision. Section 703(a)(1), also contained in note 26, is
the provision making disparate treatment unlawful. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).
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2. The 1972 Amendments
Congress amended Title VII in 1972170 and endorsed the Griggs effects
test and the Court's requirement that the employer prove the existence of an
overriding business necessity. 171 The Court in Connecticut v. Teal 172 noted
that "[tihe legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII . . . demon-
strates that Congress recognized and endorsed the disparate-impact analysis em-
ployed by the Court in Griggs." The Court explained that "[b]oth the House
and Senate Reports cited Griggs with approval, the Senate report noting: 'Em-
ployment discrimination as viewed today is a . . . complex and pervasive
phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject now generally describe the
problem in terms of "systems" and "effects" rather than simply intentional
wrongs.' "173
While, in 1964, outlawing purposeful discrimination was the principal goal
of Congress, in 1972 Congress reiterated in even stronger terms than in 1964
the need to combat disparate impact discrimination. The recognition that "in-
stitutional" barriers were a different type of discrimination from discrimination
170. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). See generally Legislative History of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Subcommittee on Labor of the United States Senate Committee on Labor and Pub-
lic Welfare (1972) (containing House and Senate Reports, text of bills and Congressional debates contained
in the Congressional Record).
The legislative history most relevant to this article pertains to those amendments that extended the pro-
tection of § 703(a)(2) to "applicants for employment" as well as employees, and the amendments that extend-
ed the coverage of Title VII to federal and state employees. §§ 701(a), (b), and (e), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-(a),
(b), and (e) (1982); § 717, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982).
171. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971); see also id. at 22 ("[I]f the use of
the test acts to maintain existing or past discriminatory imbalances in the job, or tends to discriminate against
applicants on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, the employer must show an overrid-
ing business necessity to justify use of the test."); id. at 8 ("showing of an overriding business necessity
for the use of such criteria"). Although no one suggested in the debates of the 1972 amendments that the
employer's burden was merely that of articulating a legitimate reason for engaging in practices that systemat-
ically excluded minorities or women, Congress was clear that the employer's burden was substantial. For
instance, Senator Dominick explained that under Griggs, "'employment tests, even if fairly applied, are in-
valid, if they have a discriminatory effect and can't be justified on the basis of business necessity.'" 118
CONG. REC. 697 (1972) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
172. 457 U.S. 440, 447 n.8 (1982).
173. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971)). See also H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971). Congress further ratified Griggs by providing that: "In any area where the new
law does not address itself, or in any areas where a specific contrary intention is not indicated . . . present
case law as developed by the courts would continue to govern the applicability and construction of Title
VII" 118 CONG. REC. 7564 (1972). See also Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 470
(1986) (in language that could hardly be more explicit, "[tihe section-by-section analysis" submitted to both
houses "confirmed Congress' resolve to accept prevailing judicial interpretation regarding the scope of Title
VII"). Congress adopted the Griggs effects test and rules of law to define prohibited conduct by the Voting
Rights Act as well as the Rehabilitation Act. The legislative history of the Voting Rights Act Amendments
of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982), shows express reliance on Griggs: "the results test to be codified in
Section 2 is a well defined standard, first enunciated by the Supreme Court and followed in numerous lower
federal court decisions." S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AoMIN. NEWS 192, 193. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982), has been similar-
ly held to incorporate Griggs standards. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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motivated by animus was more pronounced. 174 And, the pervasiveness of in-
stitutional discrimination had become clear from the six years of Title VII liti-
gation that preceded the 1972 amendment process. 171
Interpreting Congress' actions in 1972 with respect to the disparate impact
theory is very different from the statutory analysis of congressional inaction
in the recent reargument in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union176  where the
Court considered reversing its decision in Runyon v. McCrary. 7 In Patter-
son, both sides advanced various theories of statutory interpretation 178  to ex-
plain the import of Congress' failure to overturn the Court's decisions interpreting
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 179 In Wards Cove, the Court was asked to over-
turn Griggs in face of the overwhelming evidence that Congress ratified the
effects test developed in Griggs and reemphasized its goal, first stated in the
legislative history of 1964, of opening opportunities closed by institutional bar-
riers, in addition to outlawing purposeful discrimination. Whether applying the
174. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1971) ("where discrimination is institutional,
rather than merely a matter of bad faith, . . . corrective measures appear to be urgently required"). Further,
Congress extended Title VII to federal employees, who previously could invoke only Civil Service Commis-
sion administrative remedies, because the Commission had erroneously "assume[d] that employment dis-
crimination in the Federal Government is solely a matter of malicious intent on the part of individuals,"
and "ha[d] not fully recognized that the general rules and procedures that it had promulgated may in them-
selves constitute systemic barriers to minorities and women." Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 24 (1971). Title VII was extended to state employees for similar reasons. See H.R. REP. No. 238
at 17 ("widespread discrimination against minorities exists in State and local government employment and
• ..the existence of this discrimination is perpetuated by the presence of both institutional and overt dis-
criminatory practices").
175. For instance, Senator Dominick, who sponsored the Nixon Administration's court-enforcement ap-
proach as an alternative to the proposal to give EEOC cease-and-desist powers, stated that" 'most discriminatory
treatment is institutional: subtle practices that leave minorities at a disadvantage.'" 118 CONG. REc. 697
(1972). See also 118 CONG. REC. 944-45 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Spong) ("a significant part of the problem
today is not the simple, willful act of some employer but rather the effect of long-established practices or
systems in which there may be no intent to discriminate or even knowledge that such is the effect").
176. 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (reargument in this race discrimination case brought under the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982)). See supra note 3.
177. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). The Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibited a private school from ex-
cluding children because they were black.
178. The briefs for petitioner and several amici strongly rely on several legislative inaction arguments.
See Brief for Petitioner on Reargument at 71-100, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988)
(No. 87-107); Brief of 66 Members of the United States Senate and 118 Members of the United States House
of Representatives as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 20-28, Patterson; Brief on Reargument for
the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11-16,
Patterson. Contra Brief of Washington Legal Foundation at 26-30, Patterson. See also Symposium: Patter-
son v. McLean, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1988) (Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction and Civil
Rights, at 2-19; Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, at 20-66; Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative
Inaction, at 67-137).
179. See supra note 3.
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ing the "plain meaning" or "intent" statutory analysis to section 703(a)(2), 180
the conclusion firmly established that the disparate impact theory developed
by Griggs and its progeny should not be overruled by the Court.18'
B. Administrative Interpretations of Section 703 (a) (2)
Contemporaneous constructions of statutes are given great deference by
180. The debate within the courts and academia about statutory interpretation has accelerated in the last
few years, in part because of Justice Scalia's interest and the Reagan Administration's advocacy of "original
intent," especially in constitutional interpretation. Two methodologies dominate the debate: textualism (or
plain meaning) and intentionalism (or purpose analysis). These models are premised on legislative suprema-
cy and separation of powers. See generally W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988). The strict "textualist" approach has declined in recent years because
of the recognition that many statutory questions simply cannot be answered by applying the statute's plain
or most probable meaning. Consequently, where the language itself does not provide a satisfactory answer,
most scholars of legislation look at the larger "context" of the statute. Three distinctly different "contextual"
approaches have evolved. First, the interpretation which best advances the basic "purpose" of the statute.
See, e.g., H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958). See also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-08 (1979)
as an example of an application of this approach. Second, the law and economic proponents, such as Judge
Posner, argue that the interpreter should answer the question the way the legislature originally enacting the
statute would have, through "imaginative reconstruction." See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CRISIS AND REFORM (1985). For an example of "imaginative interpretation," see Justice Rehnquist's dissent
in Weber, 443 U.S. at 219-55. See also Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983)
(also criticizes Hart & Sacks but appears to defend plain meaning rule). Third, taking approaches from liter-
ary theory that show how literary texts change from reader to reader and over time, "dynamic" interpreters
look at statutory texts as transformed every time they are interpreted. See, e.g., Eskridge, Dynamic Statuto-
ry Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). Eskridge argues that statutory interpretation involves
understanding and reconciliation of three perspectives:
(1) the statutory text, which is the formal focus of interpretation and a constraint on the range of
interpretive options available (textual perspective); (2) the original legislative expectations surround-
ing the statute's creation, including compromises reached (historical perspective); and (3) the subse-
quent evolution of the statute and its present context, especially the ways in which the societal and
legal environment of the statute has materially changed over time (evolutive perspective).
Id. at 1483. See also R. DWORKIN, supra note 8 (arguing that statutes should be interpreted similarly to
common law) and Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1982) (analogy to literature).
For an example of dynamic interpretation, see Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Weber, 443 U.S.
at 209-16. Lastly, Justice Scalia rejects relying on legislative history. He first looks to the plain meaning;
and then, if it is not determinate, he searches for other sources of meaning, such as similar language in
other statutes, see, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2549-51 (1988), or analogizes it with relat-
ed legislation, see, e.g., United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
Applying any one of these methodologies leads to the same conclusion that Title VII makes available
to victims of discrimination a disparate impact analysis which shifts the burden to the employer to prove
job-relatedness. The dynamic theory is better suited to deciding cases of such fundamental importance.
181. Principles of stare decisis also mandate adherence to Griggs and its progeny. Stare decisis "weigh[s]
heavily" and precludes a departure from precedent where Congress had the opportunity to reject the "Court's
interpretation of its legislation" but declined to do so. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
Accord NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 473 U.S. 61, 84 (1985). Not only did Congress in
1972 decline to reject the Court's interpretation of § 703(a)(2) articulated in Griggs, it adopted and highlight-
ed it. See also Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1982) (in deciding whether to overrule
an earlier case, the Court is required to determine whether that act "would be inconsistent with more recent
expressions of Congressional intent"); Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 695-96 (1978).
See also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 612 (1983) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (constrained to follow Court's prior interpretation of Title VII).
1988] TITLE VII DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS
the Supreme Court. 182 The Court in Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC 8 3
noted that Griggs' interpretation of section 703(a)(2) was consistent with con-
temporaneous interpretations of both the Justice Department and the EEOC,
agencies charged with the enforcement of Title VII.I84 The administrative guide-
lines on disparate impact have been construed as "expressing the will of Con-
gress." 185 And, the EEOC interpreted section 703(a)(2), in guidelines adopted
in 1966 and elaborated in 1970, as prohibiting the use of any test or selection
technique that is discriminatory in operation unless the employer could estab-
lish job-relatedness. 186
182. The parameters developed by the Court with respect to administrative interpretation of statutes are
set forth by Chief Justice Warren in Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965):
When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the in-
terpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration. "To sustain
the Commission's application of this statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only
reasonable one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the
first instance in judicial proceedings." "Particularly is this respect due when the administrative prac-
tice at stake 'involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men [and women] charged
with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and
smoothly while they are yet untried and new.'"
Id. at 16 (quoting Unemployment Compensation Comm'n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1964)
and Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408
(1961)) (citations omitted). See also Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 549, 562 n.95 (collects cases and articulates ten factors which the Court considers in deciding to
defer to administrative interpretations).
183. 478 U.S. 421, 465-66 (1986).
184. Both agencies have enforcement responsibilities under Title VII. The Justice Department may initi-
ate a civil action against state and local bodies and the EEOC may bring a civil action against any non-
government respondent. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1982) (authority
for "pattern or practice" actions); Reorg. Plan No. I of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. at 1155 (1982), and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978).
185. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 431 (because Guidelines are consistent with
statutory language and legislative history, they are "entitled to great deference"); see also Local 28, Sheet
Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 465-66 (1986); Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 518 (1986). Cf General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-45 (1976) (EEOC
Guidelines on sex discrimination not followed because they contradicted agency's earlier positions and were
inconsistent with Congress' plain intent); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 93-95 (1973). Congress
reversed Gilbert by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)). Other recent reversals of the Court by Congress in civil rights
cases include the Civil Rights Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 31 (1988) (reversing Grove
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), which limited the reach of Title IX of the Educational Act of
1972), and the Voting Rights Act amendments of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982) (reversing City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), in which a plurality rejected precedent by requiring proof of discriminatory
purpose).
186. EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.3, 1607.13 (1970) (elaborat-
ing EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures, reprinted in EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 16,904
(1967)). See also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433 n.9. The EEOC's 1970 revision prior to the Court's decision in
Griggs treated disparate impact and treatment discrimination as distinct evils, prohibiting both.
The principle of disparate or unequal treatment must be distinguished from the concepts of valida-
tion. A test or other employee selection standard-even though validated against job performance
in accordance with the guidelines in this part-cannot be imposed upon any individual or class pro-
tected by Title VII where other employees, applicants or members have not been subject to that standard.
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C. Theoretical Underpinnings- Group-Based Concept of Equality
The Griggs/Albemarle impact theory was the high water mark of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII. It signaled a broad approach to
effectuate the eradication of the myriad forms of overt, subtle, conscious and
unconscious discrimination. As the Court wrote:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII... was to achieve equality
of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past
to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees. Under
the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral
in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo
of prior discriminatory employment practices .... What is required . . . is the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other im-
permissible classification. 187
The critical necessity of eliminating all the "built-in headwinds" 188 for minori-
ties and women in the working life of this country requires lawyers, represent-
ing either plaintiffs or defendants, and judges to recall the essential human values
embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In times of retreat from a national
commitment to the rigorous enforcement of the civil rights laws and spirit, 189
lawyers play an important role in assuring that our country does not become
two societies, one white and privileged, the other minority, female and outside
the mainstream. 190
The concept of equality embodied in Griggs recognizes the group interest
in assuring that group members are not injured in employment because of dis-
crimination throughout society. Griggs redefined discrimination as the opera-
tion of a society that adversely affected minority (and women) group members,
not simply isolated acts of aberrant individuals. It was a recognition of the eco-
29 C.F.R. § 1607.11 (1970). The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §
1607 (1986)-which superseded the EEOC Guidelines and were adopted by the EEOC, the Department of
Justice, the Department of Labor and the Civil Service Commission in 1978-similarly require the applica-
tion of disparate impact analysis to "any selection procedure" and embrace the evidentiary standards of Griggs.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1988). Like the EEOC Guidelines, the Uniform Guidelines separately prohibit
both unjustified disparate impact and disparate treatment in the use of selection procedures. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.11 (1988) ("The principles of disparate or unequal treatment must be distinguished from the concepts
of validation.").
187. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30, 431.
188. Id. at 432.
189. See supra note 25.
190. See supra note 9.
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nomic and social facts of our society and its employer-employee systems. Thus,
Title VII includes a concern for equal opportunity in addition to equal treat-
ment, focusing on the harm to both groups and individuals. The litigation of
Title VII must consistently be related to the social problems that generated the
enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and that continue to be a structural part
of our economy. Although state of mind continues to be an essential compo-
nent of disparate treatment cases, it is conduct measured in terms of adverse
consequences inflicted on minorities and women that must become embedded
in our jurisprudential and sociological ideas. The principle of liberal
construction 91 of this essential remedial civil rights statute must be applied
to ensure that Title VII continues to be a serious response to a complex social
problem.
In a case that some commentators saw as a retreat from the group-centered
concept first articulated in Griggs, 192 the Supreme Court in Connecticut v.
Teal 193 ruled that a plaintiff could state a disproportionate impact claim when
one of the selection criteria disproportionately excludes members of a protect-
ed group even though the end result of the total selection process is balanced.
Rejection of the "bottom-line" concept as a defense to the prima facie case was
seen by some as discouraging employers from voluntarily implementing affir-
mative action plans. 194
In Teal, four black employees of the Department of Income Maintenance
of the State of Connecticut were promoted provisionally to supervisory posi-
tions and served almost two years. To obtain permanent status, they had first
to receive a passing score on a written examination. Permanent promotions were
then made from the list of eligibles generated by the written examination by
considering past performance, recommendations and, to a lesser extent, seniority.
The Department then applied an affirmative action program. The four plain-
tiffs failed the exam and were not further considered. Of the original forty-
eight black candidates, 22.9% were promoted and 13.5 % of the whites were
promoted, resulting in eleven blacks promoted out of forty-six promoted to per-
manent positions. '9
191. See supra note 28.
192. See, e.g., Blumrosem, The Group Interest Concept, Employment Discrimination and Legislative In-
tent: The Fallacy of Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 99 (1983).
193. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
194. Id. If an employer that successfully, through an affirmative action program, hired protected group
members at a rate equal to or greater than the available pool and nevertheless was liable for a disparate
impact on part of the hiring or promotion practice, it is argued that employers would lose their incentive.
195. 457 U.S. at 444.
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In holding that where "'an identifiable pass-fail barrier denies an employ-
ment opportunity to a disproportionately large number of minorities and pre-
vents them from proceeding to the next step in the selection process,' that barrier
must be shown to be job related," 96 the Court reasoned that section 703(a)(2)
focused on employment practices that create a discriminatory bar to opportuni-
ties. 197 Further, it noted that the section prohibits practices that deprive "any
individual of employment opportunities." 198
Thus, the Court in Teal emphasized Title Vls focus on preserving individual
rights to equal opportunity. However, at the same time, it reaffirmed that when
blacks as a group are disproportionately excluded from consideration by a non-
validated examination disproportionate impact cannot be measured only at the
bottom line. The key issue in Teal is at what point in the process does one de-
termine whether there has been a disproportionate exclusion of a protected group?
D. Critical Distinctions Between Individual Disparate Treatment
and Class-Wide Disparate Impact Evidentiary Analyses
The two principal theories of discrimination, disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact, were developed to analyze the different kinds of evidence typi-
cally presented in these distinctly different types of cases. On the one hand,
the McDonnell Douglas individual disparate treatment model involves a dis-
crete act of intentional discrimination against a single individual. 199 On the
other hand, the Griggs disparate impact model was developed for analyzing
evidence concerning employment practices and policies that affect large num-
bers of people on a classwide basis. 2 00 Similarly, the direct evidence 20' and
the Teamsters pattern or practice 2 02 intentional discrimination models were also
developed for analyzing evidence involving large numbers of people on a class-
wide basis.
In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff has a low prima facie threshold
usually established through circumstantial evidence. The plaintiff's prima facie
case is "not onerous"203 because it is designed to eliminate the most common
196. Id. at 445.
197. The Court also cited New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1978) ("A prima facie
violation of the Act may be established by statistical evidence showing that an employment practice has the
effect of denying members of one race equal access to employment opportunities.").
198. 457 U.S. at 455-56. The Court also cited its prior decision in Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 579 (1978), in which it wrote: "It is clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII
is to provide an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether members
of the applicant's race are already proportionately represented in the work force."
199. See supra Part II.B for a full discussion of the order and allocation of proof.
200. See supra Part II.A for the order and allocation of proof.
201. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of direct evidence cases.
202. See supra Part II.B.4 for a discussion of pattern or practice cases.
203. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. Essentially, the plaintiff need only show that he was a protected group
member, that he was qualified for a position and that he was rejected. See supra Part lI.B. 1.
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reasons for his failure to be hired, promoted or otherwise treated equally. This
minimal showing simply "raises an inference of discrimination only because
we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based
on the consideration of impermissible factors." 20 4 The purpose of the order
of proof in these cases is gradually to narrow the issue of the employer's intent.
The prima facie case does not in itself establish a violation of section
703(a)(1). Thus, the employer need only articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its employment decision. It must produce sufficient evidence to raise
"a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. ' 20 5
At the final stage, the plaintiff must prove that the employer's articulated rea-
son is a mere pretext for intentional discrimination. In other words, it is not
until the final and third stage that the plaintiff actually proves discrimination
by eliminating both the most common nondiscriminatory motivations for the
employer's apparently discriminatory treatment, but also the particular non-
discriminatory reasons proffered by the employer. Thus, in an individual dis-
parate treatment case, the burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue occurs
in the final stage. For this reason, it makes sense not to place the burden of
persuasion on the employer at the second stage.
In stark contrast, in a disparate impact case, the plaintiff's prima facie bur-
den is significantly different. Plaintiffs face a much higher prima facie burden,
usually consisting of substantial probative statistical evidence of adverse im-
pact. This proof constitutes direct evidence of a violation of section 703(a)(2).
The plaintiff's burden is indeed an onerous one, and the statistics relied on are
often vigorously disputed. 206
The heavier burden carried by plaintiffs convincingly demonstrates the very
evil that type of analysis is designed to uncover. Unless rebutted by the em-
ployer, a ruling for the plaintiff is compelled. Merely requiring the same slight
burden that the employer has in a treatment case would be inappropriate in an
impact case. The distinctions in proof justify the shifting of a burden of per-
suasion.
Although the Court has never termed it as such, the employer's burden in
responding to a disparate impact prima facie case is in the nature of an affirma-
tive defense. 207 In other words, failure to justify the business necessity of the
challenged practices and procedures ends the case because the prima facie case
204. Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
205. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
206. See supra note 62. Because of the complexity and sophisticated nature of statistical proof, the as-
sistance of experts is usually necessary. In an ominous development, at least one court of appeals held that
a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII case was precluded from receiving full reimbursement for the expert's
fees because a federal court is bound by the $30 per day limit imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982). Gilbert
v. City of Little Rock, 867 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing, among other cases, Crawford Fitting Co.
v. Gibbons, 482 U.S. 437 (1987)) ($93,946 fees claimed compared to $900 awarded under statute). If this
becomes the law, it will have a devastating impact on plaintiffs' ability to retain experts in order to meet
their heavy threshold requirement.
207. For a discussion of affirmative defenses, see C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 77, at § 2371.
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establishes a presumptively illegal practice. Where the plaintiff proves the ele-
ments of a prima facie case through showing a causal connection between the
injury to the protected group (e.g., disproportionate rate of hire) and the em-
ployer's conduct (e.g., application of subjective interview process), the defen-
dant must affirmatively prove the necessity for the challenged practice. The
policy rationale favoring this model is discussed later.
In sum, the prima facie showing of an individual disparate treatment case
is simply the first step in a process to extract the employer's intent. In contrast,
the disparate impact analysis focuses solely on the effect of an employer's prac-
tice. A prima facie showing of statistical disparity is complete proof of unlaw-
ful discrimination, unless the presumption of illegality is rebutted by proof of
the business necessity of the challenged practice. The distinctions are stark and
rational and justify shifting the burden of persuasion, rather than merely produc-
tion, to the employer in a disparate impact analysis.
E. Public Policy
Title VII is one of the most important legislative enactments of this centu-
ry. It was born out of the struggles of black people, particularly in the South,
in the 1950s and 1960s and was embraced by people of this country as a moral
necessity. It has meant, for minorities and women, a national commitment to
eradicate both the worst forms of invidious discrimination and the institutional
barriers that excluded them from reaching for and realizing their full potential
as contributing workers. Denial of job opportunities also results in a denial of
dignity and political and economic empowerment. In its short twenty-four-year
life as a remedial civil rights statute, Title VII has contributed significantly to
the transformation of the working life of this country. 2 08 Many of its goals
208. While there are no studies measuring Title VII's sole impact on the labor market, the participation
of women and minorities has increased significantly since its effective date. At least one study of contractors
subject to the nondiscrimination and affirmative action requirements of Exec. Order No. 11,246 demon-
strated that the laws had a significant positive impact. See EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS, supra note 9. Title VII
became effective in July, 1965. Between 1965 and 1975, women increased their representation in the civilian
labor force from 39% to 46%, a rate that rose to 50% by 1985. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HAND-
BOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS (June, 1985). By the year 2000, about 47% of the workforce will be women.
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OPPORTUNITY 2000: CREATIVE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION STRATEGIES FOR A CHANGING
WORKFORCE 7 (1988) (citing W. JOHNSON & A. PACKER, WORKFORCE 2000 (Hudson Inst. 1987)). By the
year 2000, minority group members, especially blacks and Hispanics, will represent almost a third of all
new entrants into the labor force-twice their current share. Id. at 8. In 1965, approximately eight million
black Americans were in the workforce, which increased to 9.3 million in 1975 and 12.4 million in 1985.
Id. at 8-9. Increased participation by women in some professions has been significant. For example, from
1979 to 1986, female auditors and accountants increased from 34% to 45%, from 10% to 15% in the legal
profession (in 1983, 36% of law graduates were women), from 28% to 40% in computer programming,
from 4% to 9% in electronic engineering and from 22% to 29% in management and administration (in 1983,
42% of business majors were women). U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MALE-FEMALE DIFFERENCES IN WORK Ex-
PERIENCE, OCCUPATIONS AND EARNINGS (1987). Black women comprise the largest increase in the non-white
labor force, and it is estimated that they will outnumber black men in the workforce. OPPORTUNITY 2000,
supra, at 9. Black women already outnumber black men in higher education. Id. (citing As Black Women
Rise in Professional Ranks, Marriage Gets Chancey, Wall St. J., May 16, 1986, at 1, col. 1).
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are yet unrealized. "Built-in headwinds" continue to impede the movement of
minorities and women into many sectors and levels of employment. 209 Wage
disparities between women and minorities and white men remain large. Neverthe-
less, the disparate impact analysis developed by the Court in Griggs to effectu-
ate section 703(a)(2) continues to be a vital part of a national effort to provide
equal opportunities for members of protected groups historically discriminated
against.
The proposal by the Solicitor General in Wards Cove would thwart the specif-
ic remedial purpose of section 703(a)(2) by making it virtually impossible to
prevail on a claim of disparate impact. In effect, the provision would be repealed
as an independent substantive section of Title VII. The Solicitor General's
proposal to replace the Griggs standard would legitimize practices that have
a disproportionate impact whenever the employer could simply articulate a "legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its actions. As a result, the plaintiff would
have both the burden of proving a prima facie case of disparate impact and the
burden of disproving business necessity.
The employer's burden of proving an "overriding business necessity" in sec-
tion 703(a)(2) cases is appropriately high to fulfill the critical public policy of
creating a society free from discrimination based on racial, sexual or other sta-
tus. An employer will usually defend business necessity based upon validation
of the measurement in question. 210 Placing this burden on the plaintiff under-
cuts the important public policy of encouraging employers continually to veri-
fy the business necessity of all of their practices and procedures.211 Reversing
the burden will send a message that conducting job validation studies in ad-
vance of litigation will only expose the employer to a greater risk of liability
than it faces in litigation where the plaintiffs are unlikely to conduct a full vali-
dation study.
209. See supra note 9.
210. The Solicitor General suggests that subjective selection procedures are impossible to validate. See
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 25 n.35, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio (No. 87-1387);
Brief for Petitioners at 47, Wards Cove. This argument is dispelled in Part IV of this Article.
211. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1978) [hereinafter "Uni-
form Guidelines"]. Pursuant to the Uniform Guidelines, employers must maintain records "of persons by
identifiable race, sex, or ethnic group" in order to determine whether a selection device has an adverse im-
pact on protected group members, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (1978), and maintain records by race, etc., of the
number of persons hired and number of applicants, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.15 (1978). See also Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2796 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) ("an employer that complies with the EEOC's recording requirements, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4 and 1607.15
(1987), and keeps track of the effect of its practices on protected classes, will be better prepared to document
the correlation between its employment practices and successful job performance when required to do so
by Title VII"). Procedures which result in an adverse impact constitute discrimination unless validated. 29
C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1988).
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As a practical matter, only the employer has sufficient resources"' and
access to, and familiarity with, the employment records and jobs at issue to
conduct a validation study. 213  It is a complex and time-consuming process.
Validation studies require a thorough understanding of the requirements of the
job, everyday access to the workplace214 and substantial access to current em-
ployees.
Discrimination and equal opportunity in the workplace cannot be accom-
plished solely by employers. Decent schools, housing and health care, for in-
stance, are also vital to providing everyone with all the tools necessary to compete
in the job market. 215 Nevertheless, employers should play a significant role
in achieving the goals of Title VII. Placing the burden of proving business neces-
sity on employers is a small but vital burden.
212. It is sensible for employers, as part of a national scheme to end discrimination, to bear these and
other costs. Employers make up these costs through tax policies that permit the employer to consider valida-
tion studies as a normal business expense.
The Equal Employment Advisory Council ("EEAC") suggests without documentation in its amicus brief
that validation studies cost between $100,000 and $400,000. See Brief for EEAC at 21 n.4, Wards Cove.
That estimate is in stark contrast with a survey of 1339 employers which found that most validation studies
cost as little as $5,000. See Friedman & Williams, Current Use of Tests for Employment, in 2 ABILITY TEST-
ING: USES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CONTROVERSIES 99, 110-11 (1982) ("In all size categories, most compa-
nies that validated their test or nontest selection procedures spent less than $5000 per job studied.").
Congress rejected the notion of a cost-based defense in considering the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination
Act amendment to Title VII. Opponents complained that compliance would be too costly. Representative
Hawkins, sponsor of the amendment, replied:
Eradicating invidious discrimination by definition costs money; it is cheaper to pay all black workers
less than all white workers, or all women less than all men. The fact that it would cost employers
money did not prevent Congress from enacting the Equal Pay Act or Title VII, and it should not
prevent this Congress from making clear that Title VII prohibits this form of sex discrimination as well.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT 26 (1979) (committee print prepared for
the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources). The Senate Report concluded: "Even a very high
cost could not justify continuation of the policy of discrimination against pregnant women which has played
such a major part in the pattern of sex discrimination in this country." Id. at 48. The Supreme Court explicit-
ly rejected a cost-based defense on three separate occasions. Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S.
1073 (1983); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983); Los Angeles
Dep't Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). See also Hayes v. Shelby Mem. Hosp., 726 F.2d
1543, 1552 n. 15 (1 lth Cir. 1984); Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303,307 (4th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982); Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d at 799-800 and n.8; Gathercole v.
Global Assocs., 545 F. Supp. 1280, 1282 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
213. Cf International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 n.45 (1977):
[T]he employer [is] in the best position to show why any individual employee was denied an employ-
ment opportunity. Insofar as the reasons related to available vacancies or the employer's evaluation
of the applicant's qualifications, the company's records [are] the most relevant items of proof. If the
refusal to hire was based on other factors, the employer and its agents [know] best what those factors
were and the extent to which they influenced the decisionmaking process.
214. Civil discovery and access to the EEOC files are insufficient substitutes for everyday access. Also,
sometimes plaintiffs are barred from the workplace. See, e.g., Belcher v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc.,
588 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1978).
215. See Friedman, supra note 107, at 52 (arguing that race neutrality disregards the "sad history of educa-
tional, social, and economic discrimination"). Other commentators discount race as the dominant factor.
See, e.g., T. SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 42-48 (1984) (asserting that the effects of
demographic, cultural, and geographic differences on incomes and occupations of racial groups often ac-
count for the disparities attributed primarily to discrimination). See also EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd, 839 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1988) (employer presented historical,
sociological and other evidence that women were not interested in sales positions). The Sears argument is
refuted in M. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION (forthcoming).
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IV. VALIDATION OF SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA
Subjective criteria216 are amenable to the same "psychometric scrutiny"
as objective screening devices, such as written tests. 217 Employers in proving
the business necessity of a challenged subjective practice should be required
to present probative evidence, similar to that required when an objective test
is challenged. 2 18 The Uniform Guidelines define the procedures that are sub-
ject to disparate impact review as "[a]ny measure, combination of measures,
or procedures used as a basis for any employment decision."2" 9 Moreover, the
Guidelines reference the professional standards described in the "Standards" pre-
pared jointly by the American Psychological Association (APA), the Ameri-
can Educational Research Association (AERA) and the National Council of
Measurement in Education (NCME). 220 These Standards are applicable to sub-
jective selection devices. 22 Whether it is an objective or subjective selection
216. The term subjective means "[m]easures that require the statement of opinion, beliefs, or judgments."
I. GOLDSTEIN, TRAINING IN ORGANIZATIONS 136 (2d ed. 1986) ("For example, rating scales are subjective
measures, while measures of absenteeism are more objective. (However, supervisors' ratings of the absen-
teeism level of employees could turn that measure into a subjective criterion.)"). Id.
217. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2795 n.5 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part) (citing the American Psychological Association Brief as amicus curiae). The United States as amicus
curiae in Wards Cove suggested in a footnote that subjective selection procedures are impossible to validate.
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 25, n.35, Wards Cove; Brief for Petitioners at 47, Wards
Cove (offering no explanation).
218. For a scholarly discussion of validating a scored test, see Guardians Ass'n of New York Police Dep't,
Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981).
In Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 938 (1981), the Eighth Circuit appears to require total compliance with the Guidelines.
219. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16(q) (1988). It reads in relevant part:
Any measure, combination of measures, or procedure used as a basis for any employment decision.
Selection procedures include the full range of assessment techniques from traditional paper and pen-
cil tests, performance tests, training programs, or probationary periods and physical, educational,
and work experience requirements through informal or casual interviews and unscored application forms.
(emphasis added).
220. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(c) (1988) (The Uniform Guidelines "are intended to be consistent with general-
ly accepted professional standards for evaluating standardized tests and other selection procedures, such as
those described in the Standards . . . prepared by a joint committee of the American Psychological Associa-
tion (APA), the American Educational Research Association (AERA), and the National Council of Meas-
urement in Education (NCME)."). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1607. 1(B) (1988) (the Guidelines "incorporate a
single set of principles which are designed to assist employers . . . to comply with requirements of Federal
law prohibiting employment practices which discriminate on the grounds of race, etc.").
221. The APA's STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (1985) [hereinafter STAN-
DARDS], and its DIVISION 14 OF INDUSTRIAL-ORGANIZATION PSYCHOLOGY, THE PRINCIPLES FOR VALIDA-
TION AND USE OF PERSONNEL SELECTION PROCEDURES (1987) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]. The term "testing"
is generic and refers to "standardized ability . . . instruments, diagnostic, and evaluative devices, interest
inventories, personality inventories, and projective instruments." STANDARDS, supra, at 3. It also includes
samples of observable behavior "relevant to ... employment decision-making." Id. at 4. The PRINCIPLES
similarly apply both to standardized tests and "performance tests .... personality [and] interest inventories,
• . . biographical data forms or scored application blanks, interviews, . . . experience requirements, . . . ap-
praisals of job performance, . . . [and] estimates of advancement potential." PRINCIPLES, supra, at 1. The
Uniform Guidelines "provide a framework for determining" both "the proper use of tests" and "other selec-
tion procedures." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1 (B) (1988). They "apply to tests and other selection procedures which
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device, the evidence presented to prove business necessity must be sufficiently
probative to demonstrate that the device does what it purports to do -accurately
measure the desired performance.
The professional judgment of the organizations whose Standards and Prin-
ciples form the backbone of the Guidelines leads to the conclusion that subjec-
tive assessment devices can be scientifically 2 22 scrutinized under the applicable
standards, principles and guidelines.
A. Validity and Reliability
Employers must ensure that their selection devices are both reliable and
valid. "Reliability refers to the degree to which test scores are free from errors
in measurement. ' 223 Validity is considered the more important; however, both
are crucial. 224 Validation is the process to determine the degree to which cer-
tain inferences from a particular selection device are appropriate, meaningful
are used as a basis for any employment decision[,] including "hiring and promotion." Id. at § 1607.2(B).
See also id. at § 1607.15(A)(1) (referring to selection procedures "either standardized or not standardized");
B. SCHNEIDER & N. SCHMITT, STAFFING ORGANIZATIONS 14 (2d ed. 1986):
Typically we think of a test as an examination of some kind responded to with paper and pencil.
... In fact, industrial psychologists and the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures
(1978) have defined the word "test" in much broader terms and the courts have adopted this defini-
tion. In brief, a test is defined as any form of collecting information when that information is used
as a basis for making an employment decision. So, interviews are tests, as are application blanks,
• ..performance appraisals used as a basis for making promotions (which, obviously are selection
decisions), and any other kind of information used for making employment decisions.
222. Courts should look to the "scientific" and professional standards developed by industrial and educa-
tional psychologists and other experts to set the parameters of reliability and validity. However, courts will
need to probe the assumptions derived from the particular facts and subject the findings to the scrutiny of
reason. The Second Circuit noted in Guardians Ass'n of New York Police Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n
of New York, 630 F.2d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981), that, while the "study
of employment testing.., has necessarily been adopted by the law as a result of Title VII," it is "not primar-
ily a legal subject." Instead,
[iut is part of the general field of educational and industrial psychology, and possesses its own metho-
dology, its own body of research, its own experts, and its own terminology. The translation of a
technical study such as this into a set of legal principles requires a clear awareness of the limits of
both testing and law. It would be entirely inappropriate for the law to ignore what has been learned
about employment testing in assessing the validity of these tests. At the same time, the science of
testing is not as precise as physics or chemistry, nor its conclusions as provable. While courts should
draw upon the findings of experts in the field of testing, they should not hesitate to subject these
findings to both the scrutiny of reason and the guidance of Congressional intent.
Id.
223. STANDARDS, supra note 221, at 19. See also PRINCIPLES, supra note 221, at 39.
224. STANDARDS, supra note 221, at 9 ("validity is the most important consideration in test evaluation").
See also A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 27 (5th ed. 1982) ("Undoubtedly the most important ques-
tion to be asked about any psychological test concerns its validity ...."); L. CRONBACH, ESSENTIALS OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 125 (4th ed. 1984) ("Obviously, no aspect of a test is more important than validity
.. . )
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or useful.225  The predictions inferred from a device must have a high rate of
accuracy for the device to be considered "validated." It must predict perfor-
mance of a specific task or set of tasks. 226 Validity studies can be accomplished
in a number of ways.
First, of course, the employer must maintain accurate records to measure
the impact on protected group members.227 Once an impact is determined, the
Guidelines detail various validation procedures and allow the employer to pur-
sue new strategies for validation "as they become accepted by the psychologi-
cal profession." 228  Three methodologies for conducting validity studies are set
out in great detail in the Guidelines. 229
The employer must start with a job analysis, utilizing any of the validation
methodologies. 230  A job analysis is a process by which the employer identi-
fies the critical components of successful job performance. 231 The analysis in-
cludes the articulation of the knowledge, skills and abilities, or other personal
characteristics or behaviors the demonstration of which determine proficiency
at the job. The sources of data include judgments of job incumbents, their su-
pervisors, personnel specialists and job experts, as well as job descriptions,
225. STANDARDS, supra note 221, at 9; PRINCIPLES, supra note 221, at 4. See also L. CRONBACH, supra
note 224, at 125 (if the proposed interpretation proves to be sound and relevant, it is valid); A. ANASTASI,
supra note 224, at 131 ("[validity] concerns what the test measures and how well it does so. It tells us what
can be inferred from test scores.").
226. See A. ANASTASI, supra note 224, at 432 ("The simple psychometric fact that test validity must be
ascertained for specific uses of the test has long been familiar .. . .An invalid test or one that includes
elements not related to the job under consideration may unfairly exclude minority group members who could
have performed the job satisfactorily.").
227. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4, 1607.15 (1988).
228. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(A) (1988).
229. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14 (1988) ("[tlechnical standards for validity studies"). The three methodolo-
gies include: (1) Criterion-related validity "consists of empirical data demonstrating that the selection proce-
dure is predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of job performance"; (2) Content
validity consists "of data showing that the content of the selection procedure is representative of important
aspects of performance on the job for which the candidates are to be evaluated"; and (3) Construct study
consists "of data showing that the procedure measures the degree to which candidates have identifiable charac-
teristics which have been determined to be important in successful performance in the job for which the
candidates are to be evaluated." Id. at § 1607.5(B). Although there are three categories of accumulating
validity evidence, validity is "a unitary concept." STANDARDS, supra note 221, at 9. See also Bersoff, Test-
ing and the Law, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1047, 1051 (1981) ("[I]nsofar as the courts have interpreted the
test standards and . . . the Uniform Guidelines ... to mean that content, criterion, and construct validity
are distinct forms of validation, those interpretations are oversimplified, if not erroneous.").
230. See Standard 10.4, STANDARDS, supra note 221, at 60-61 (content validation); Standard 10.1, STAN-
DARDS, supra note 221, at 60 (criterion-related); and Standard 10.8, STANDARDS, supra note 221, at 61
(construct-related).
231. PRINCIPLES, supra note 221, at 5-6.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
training manuals and other documents. 232 Relative weights must be assigned
to the various factors that determine job proficiency. A close connection be-
tween the selection device and the articulated job content or behavioral charac-
teristic must be demonstrated. 233
The employer's choice of particular selection devices and systems reflects
its explicit or implicit assumption that evaluation of the performance through
use of the particular selection device can predict performance on the job. This
assumption can only be verified by the accumulation of evidence or data sup-
porting an inference regarding the job-relatedness of the selection device. For
both subjective and objective selection devices, accurate predictors of job per-
formance are critical to provide a method of job selection that will best serve
the employer's needs, while guarding against considerations such as a person's
race or sex that are non-job-related. Validation reduces the potential for dis-
crimination and enhances the quality of the selection devices.
B. Validation of Widely-Used Subjective Devices
The Supreme Court in Albemarle recognized early on the need to closely
examine subjective performance rating systems where the employer failed to
provide adequate guidance to the evaluators. 234 In reviewing an employer's
study comparing test scores with subjective supervisory rankings, the Court
admonished that the Guidelines require that the rankings be elicited with care. 23
5
The Court criticized the vague standards because:
There is no way of knowing precisely what criteria of job performance the su-
pervisors were considering, whether each of the supervisors was considering the
same criteria or whether, indeed, any of the supervisors actually applied a fo-
cused and stable body of criteria of any kind. There is, in short, simply no way
232. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 221, at 19-20; B. SCHNEIDER & N. SCHMITT, supra note 221, at 47;
Thompson & Thompson, Court Standards for Job Analysis in Test Validation, 35 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY
865 (1982). For books that discuss job analysis procedures, see, e.g., S. GAEL, JOB ANALYSIS: A GUIDE
To ASSESSING WORK ACTIVITIES (1983); E. LEVINE, EVERYTHING You EVER WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT
JOB ANALYSIS (1983).
233. Standard 10.5, STANDARDS, supra note 221, at 61.
234. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 433 (1975).
235. Id. at 432-33. The Guidelines provide, at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.5(b)(3) and (4) (1978):
(3) The work behaviors or other criteria of employee adequacy which the test is intended to predict
or identify must be fully described; and, additionally, in the case of rating techniques, the appraisal
form(s) and instructions to the rater(s) must be included as a part of the validation evidence. Such
criteria may include measures other than actual work proficiency, such as training time, supervisory
ratings, regularity of attendance and tenure. Whatever criteria are used they must represent major
or critical work behaviors as revealed by careful job analyses.
(4) In view of the possibility of bias inherent in subjective evaluations, supervisory rating tech-
niques should be carefully developed, and the ratings should be closely examined for evidence of
bias. In addition, minorities might obtain unfairly low performance criterion scores for reasons other
than supervisor's prejudice, as when, as new employees, they have had less opportunity to learn job
skills. The general point is that all criteria need to be examined to insure freedom from factors which
would unfairly depress the scores of minority groups.
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to determine whether the criteria actually considered were sufficiently related
to the Company's legitimate interest in job-specific ability to justify a testing sys-
tem with a racially discriminatory impact. 236
More recently, in Green v. USX Corp., 237 the Third Circuit reviewed sub-
jective criteria applied in an interview process in a challenge by unsuccessful
black applicants for labor positions. It held that the employer had to prove that
the hiring practice was significantly correlated with relevant work behavior.
There is nothing mysterious about subjective selection devices; and the courts
should simply transfer their experience in reviewing validation evidence in ob-
jective disparate impact cases to the myriad of purely subjective and multi-
component 238 devices. Three commonly used subjective selection devices are
discussed below.
1. Interviews
Most subjective criteria are applied in interviews or evaluation systems.
The employment interview is one of the most widely-used selection tools. 239
It is often subject to various interview biases. 24 Interview judgments, of course,
can be valid indicators of subsequent job performance. 24 1 Interview questions
236. 422 U.S. at 433. Note 32 cautioned that "[i]t cannot escape notice that Albemarle's study was con-
ducted by plant officials, without neutral, on-the-scene oversight, at a time when this litigation was about
to come to trial. Studies so closely controlled by an interested party in litigation must be examined with
great care." Id. at 433 n.32.
237. 843 F.2d 1511 (3d Cir. 1988).
238. In Wards Cove, the petitioners argue that plaintiffs presented only "cumulative" evidence of the im-
pact and that they should be required to identify specific practices and demonstrate a specific disparate im-
pact causally associated with each practice at issue in a multi-component system. Petitioners' Brief at 31,
Wards Cove. To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs challenged sixteen specific person-
nel practices used by the employer and that six were well-founded. In any case, the adequacy of cumulative
evidence would depend on the specific facts. For instance, if the employer utilizes a system with a series
of sequential steps that are scored and a certain number of applicants are eliminated at each step, the effects
of each aspect of the screening process can be separately ascertained. Cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440, 443-44 (1982) (a qualifying written exam followed by consideration of other criteria). However, like
in Wards Cove, if the employer maintains a multifactorial selection process, with subjective elements and
unweighted components, plaintiffs should not be required to separately and independently ascertain the specific
impact. See Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511, 1524 (3d Cir. 1988); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249,
1271 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The United States conceded in Wards Cove that "if [multiple] factors combine to
produce a single ultimate selection decision and it is not possible to challenge each one, that decision may
be challenged (and defended) as a whole." Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22, Wards Cove.
239. See H. HENEMAN & D. SCHWAB, PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONNEL/HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
(3d ed. 1988).
240. Arvey, Unfair Discrimination in the Employment Interview: Legal and Psychological Aspects, 86
PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 736 (1979). For example, "stereotyping" occurs in which an applicant is judged "based
on his or her group membership [e.g., race or sex] rather than on the basis of his or her unique characteris-
tics." B. SCHNEIDER & N. SCHMITT, supra note 22 1, at 388-89. Also, the interviewer often adopts the atti-
tude that "I am wonderful and I have the following attitudes and opinions, so if candidates I interview have
the same attitudes and opinions, they must also be wonderful." Id. at 389. A common bias, the "halo" effect,
occurs where an interviewer is unduly influenced by a single trait which colors the judgment of the em-
ployee's other traits. A. ANASTASI, supra note 224, at 612.
241. See Arvey & Campion, The Employment Interview: A Summary and Review of Recent Research,
35 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 281 (1982).
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carefully linked to job analysis and performance criterion data in one study validly
predicted future job performance for women and blacks. 242 However, this con-
nection between job analysis and performance criterion data is insufficient to
establish interview validity. The skill of the interviewer in data gathering and
interpretation must also be established. 243  Employers should document inter-
viewer training and provide a structured interview guide to improve reliability,
including a structured set of questions based on a job analysis. 244 It is advis-
able to have a panel or series of individual interviews that include members
of protected groups as interviewers. 245  Records should be kept to identify those
interviewers correlating decisions with subsequent job performance to deter-
mine whose decisions are most reliable and valid. 246
2. Rating Scales
Rating scales are widely used by employers. They involve data accumulat-
ed casually and informally, and in contrast with interviews "they typically cover
a longer observation period and the information is obtained under more realis-
tic conditions. '"247 They are subject to a variety of biases. 248 One study found
that the race of the rater and ratee affected the rating scales. 249
Once more, the starting point in developing a reliable and valid rating sys-
tem is conducting a rigorous job analysis . 250  In promotion decisions, ratings
242. See Latham, Saari, Pursell & Campion, The Situational Interview, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 422
(1980).
243. A. ANASTASI, supra note 224, at 610-11.
244. See B. SCHNEIDER & N. SCHMITT, supra note 221, at 395.
245. Fisher v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527, 545 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1115 (1981) (in a race promotion case, the court noted that no black evaluator had ever participated in the
process); Wright v. National Archives & Record Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 714 (4th Cir. 1979) (court noted
the presence of blacks on a promotion panel in rejecting race claim).
246. See B. SCHNEIDER & N. SCHMITT, supra note 221, at 390-94; Hakel, Employment Interviewing, in
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (K. Rowland & G. Ferris eds. 1982). See also Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d
1511, 1516 (3d Cir. 1988) (employer policy required records of interviews, where subjective criteria were
applied, and an explication of the rationale for the decision; nevertheless these requirements were largely
ignored).
247. A. ANASTASI, supra note 224, at 611.
248. The potential bias includes: (1) Opportunity bias occurs if raters do not have the opportunity to ob-
serve the employee, but have the opportunity to do so with a competing employee; (2) halo effect occurs
when raters are unduly influenced by a single favorable or unfavorable trait which colors their judgment
on the individual's other traits; (3) error of central tendency is the tendency to place persons in the middle
of the scale and to avoid extremes; and (4) leniency error is the reluctance of many raters to assign unfavora-
ble ratings. See A. ANASTASI, supra note 224, at 612; I. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 216, at 255.
249. Kraiger & Ford, A Meta-analysis of Ratee Race Effects in Performance Ratings, 70 J. APPLIED PSY-
CHOLO GY 56 (1985). White raters assigned significantly higher ratings to white ratees than black ratees. Seventy-
four studies were reviewed involving 17,159 ratees in which the rater was white and 14 studies involving
2,420 ratees in which the rater was black. Race effects were more pronounced in real-life settings than in
laboratory settings and more likely when the proportion of blacks in the workforce was small. However,
in another study of a workplace that was highly racially integrated and where participants in the study had
been exposed to human relations training, no racial effect was found. Schmidt & Johnson, Effect of Race
on Peer Ratings in an Industrial Situation, 57 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 237 (1973).
250. PRINCIPLES, supra note 221, at 10.
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of past performance are valid if the ratings are both valid and related to future
performance. Job analyses of both positions should be conducted, indicating
the extent to which the two jobs overlap. 251 Literature critiquing rating scale
formats in the Title VII context provides useful descriptions. 212 Failure to provide
written criteria for raters was one factor resulting in a finding of discrimination
by one court. 
253
The skill of the rater, similar to that of the interviewer, is another crucial
determinant to the usefulness of a rating scale. 254 Generally, immediate
supervisors report the most accurate information. 255 Raters who have been
trained show increased reliability.25 6 In sum, conducting a job analysis to clearly
define the parameters of the job, structuring rating formats, and training the
raters are all part of a rigorous psychometrically valid rating system.
3. Experience Requirements
Employers frequently review an applicant's past experience to predict fu-
251. See Cascio & Bermardin, Implications of Performance Appraisal Litigation for Personnel Decisions,
34 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 211, 217 (1981).
252. E.g., id.; Distefano, Pryer & Erffmeyer, Application of Content Validity Methods to the Develop-
ment of a Job-Related Performance Rating Criterion, 36 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 621 (1983); Field & Hol-
ley, The Relationship of Performance Appraisal System Characteristics to Verdicts in Selected Employment
Discrimination Cases, 25 ACAD. MGMT. J. 392 (1982); Kleiman & Durham, Performance Appraisal, Pro-
motion and the Courts: A Critical Review, 34 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 103, 114 (1981); Landy & Farr,
Performance Rating, 87 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 72, 73 (1980). In one format, the graphic rating scale, several
dimensions to be rated were listed vertically. Raters make rating decisions along a horizontal 5 to 9 point
scale. For example, if the dimension to be rated is "accuracy," the scale may use a numerical or one-word
verbal rating, e.g., 1 to 5 or "high" to "low"; it may use a range of descriptions, e.g., at one end of the
scale, would be "makes too many errors"; at the other end, "almost never makes mistakes." Another format,
behaviorally anchored rating scale (BARS), uses dimensions derived by raters who use the scale with differ-
ent points on each dimension anchored by statements describing actual job behavior which illustrate specific
levels of performance, e.g., using "accuracy" in rating an auditor, the statements could include a range from
"makes frequent errors in totaling accounts" to "errors in totaling accounts are consistently rare." See gener-
ally B. SCHNEIDER & N. SCHMITT, supra note 221, at 101-06.
253. Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183, 192 (5th Cir. 1983) (unwritten subjective criteria
for promotions coupled with no written criteria for raters).
254. Kleiman & Durham, supra note 252, at 113.
255. L. CRONBACH, supra note 224, at 512.
256. A. ANASTASI, supra note 224, at 612. See also Standard 1.13, STANDARDS, supra note 221, at 16
("When criteria are composed of rater judgments, the degree of knowledge that raters have concerning ratee
performance should be reported. If possible, the training and experience of the raters should be described.");
PRINCIPLES, supra note 221, at 10 ("It may ... be necessary to train raters in the observation and evaluation
of performance. Further, supervisors should be expected to be familiar enough with the demands of the job
to evaluate overall performance."). Rater training is discussed in, e.g., Bernardin & Pence, Effects of Rater
Training: Creating New Response Sets and Decreasing Accuracy, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 60 (1980);
Borman, Format and Training Effects on Rating Accuracy and Rater Errors, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY
410 (1979); Ivancevich, Longitudinal Study of the Effects of Rater Training on Psychometric Error in Rat-
ings, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 502 (1979); Latham, Wexley & Pursell, Training Managers to Minimize
Rating Errors in the Observation of Behavior, 60 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 550 (1975). See also Wilson
v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 550 F. Supp. 1296, 1301 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (written evaluations by the raters
required and each evaluator discussed the criteria in a supervised discussion). See generally I. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 216, at 254-59.
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ture performance. The past experience must focus on "specific, job-relevant
past achievements, rather than on the passive exposure implied by the customary
education and experience records." 2 7 Once more, use of past experience must
start with a job analysis and include a structured rating format and training for
the evaluators. 258
V. CONCLUSION
The critical national goal embodied in section 703(a)(2) of Title VII to
"achieve equality of employment opportunities" by removing "artificial, arbitrary
and unnecessary barriers to employment" must be maintained and enhanced.
The group interest concept of equality articulated so profoundly in Griggs led
logically to the structure of proof that requires the employer to prove business
necessity after the plaintiff meets its heavy burden of proving a disproportion-
ate impact on a protected group. Reversing the allocation of burdens would
effectively repeal the disparate impact theory as an independent substantive pro-
vision. It is essential that the Supreme Court speak definitively and reaffirm
the analytical framework of Griggs. Equally important is the application by the
courts of psychometric principles to the validation of subjective criteria.
The economic and social facts of our society and the essential human values
embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 require a renewed commitment to
substantially advancing the effective enforcement of a national policy against
discrimination in the workplace.
ADDENDUM
After this article went to print, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,25 9 reversed the eighteen-year-old Griggs
allocation of burdens and articulated a new standard of proof. The procedural
hurdle placed in plantiff's path by the reallocation of proof is enormous. First,
the majority added an element to the plaintiff's prima facie case, requiring the
plaintiff to "'begin by identifying the specific employment practice that is
challenged .... "1,260 This requirement, said the Court, was especially neces-
sary where the employer combines subjective criteria with the use of standardized
257. A. ANASTASI, supra note 224, at 616.
258. Research on the use of valid prior experience data includes, Brush & Owens, Implementation and
Evaluation for an Assessment Classification Model for Manpower Utilization, 32 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY
369 (1979); Korman, The Prediction of Managerial Performance: A Review, 21 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY
295 (1968); Owens & Schoenfeldt, Toward a Classification of Persons, 46 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 329
(1979); Reilly & Chao, Validity and Fairness of Some Alternative Employee Selection Procedures, 35 PER-
SONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1982); Schoenfeldt, Utilization of Manpower: Development and Evaluation of an
Assessment-Classification Model for Matching Individuals with Jobs, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 583 (1974).
See generally B. SCHNEIDER & N. SCHMITT, supra note 221, at 378-82.
259. 57 U.S.L.W. 4583 (U.S. June 6, 1989) (No. 87-1387).
260. Id. at 4587 (quoting Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 2788 (1988)).
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rules or tests. Thus, the plaintiff must isolate and identify the "'specific em-
ployment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical
disparities.' "261
Second, and more importantly, the Wards Cove majority formulated a new
burden and standard of proof to analyze the employer's response after a prima
facie case is established. The case shifts to a two-component analysis of the
employer's justification for its use of the selection criteria or device. First, the
employer's justification is reviewed, and second, if plaintiffs fail to prevail, they
still have the opportunity to show that alternative selection devices or tests,
without a similar undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legiti-
mate interest(s).
The justification stage is structured as follows. The employer carries the
burden of producing evidence of a business justification for the employment
practice. The burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff, unlike under Griggs
and its progeny, where it shifted to the defendant after a prima facie case was
established.
For the majority, "the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice
serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employ-
er. 262 Further, "[tihe touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned review of the em-
ployer's justification .... "263 Although the Court admonished against a "mere
insubstantial justification," the Court provides a wide latitude to the employer's
offered justification by stating that "there is no requirement that the challenged
practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business for it to pass
muster." 264 The majority does "acknowledge that some of our earlier decisions
can be read as suggesting otherwise."26 5
This understatement is disingenuous. Without explicitedly stating so, a bare
majority overrules the unanimous Griggs decision authored by Chief Justice
Burger and supported by the Nixon Administration. The shifting of the burden
and the redefinition of the standard, through a procedural device, effectively
repeals much of the disparate impact theory as an independent substantive pro-
vision. Previously, after the demonstration of a prima facie case, the employer
met its burden only if it could show that the challenged requirement had a
"manifest relationship to the employment in question." 26 6 For eighteen years,
"[tihe touchstone [was] business necessity" and "[i]f an employment practice
which operate[d] to exclude Negroes [could not] be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice [was] prohibited." 267 Now, the Wards Cove majori-
261. Id.




266. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
267. Id. at 431.
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ty articulates the "touchstone" as a "reasoned review of the employer's justifi-
cation," '268 a considerably more lenient standard. The starkness of this new
standard's change is evident when contrasted with the Court's further elabora-
tion of the Griggs standard in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.269
Despite the Wards Cove majority placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove
that the employer's selection device is not job related, employers are, neverthe-
less, required to validate their selection devices. First, the majority continued
the Court's deference to the Uniform Employee Selection Guidelines when it
noted that employers, subject to the Guidelines, must maintain records show-
ing disparate impact.270 Procedures that have an adverse impact constitute dis-
crimination unless justified.27 The Guidelines set forth acceptable types of
validity studies to justify the use of the selection device. 2 72 Further, the majority
does not upset the approval in Albemarle of professionally accepted methods
of validating selection devices. 273 Plaintiffs will continue to challenge prac-
tices using the disparate impact theory. To avoid liability and to meet the national
goal of equal opportunities, employers must validate both objective and sub-
jective criteria.
268. 57 U.S.L.W. at 4588
269. 422 U.S. 405 (1975); see Part I1.A of this Article.
270. 57 U.S.L.W. at 4587-88.
271. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1988).
272. See id. § 1607.5 (1988).
273. 422 U.S. at 431.
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